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Edited by J. H. HARLEY

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

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THE POLISH REVIEW

INTRODUCTORY—THE PROBLEM OF POLAND

By the Editor

The Polish problem has again assumed an international character. That seems to be the most conspicuous and inevitable result of the German proclamation of the 5th November. It is true that the proclamation itself is studiously vague and had to be supplemented by two others from General von Beseler before even a hint was given of the details of the proffered Constitution. It is true, also, that there was throughout all these German declarations an unpleasant and suspicious insistence on the paramount need of a Polish army. Yet, with all its limitations, this new German move, with its Austrian correlative, is an unmistakable sign of the times. By what process of reasoning or evolutionary development could Germany, hitherto the most inflexible and ruthless of the three partitioning Powers, persuade herself to force again the future of Poland before the attention of the European Areopagus?

For some time after the beginning of the Great European War there were no signs that the German administrators expected any variation in their previous Polish policy. The mobilization in the Grand Duchy of Posen was carried on in quite an orderly fashion. In March 1915

a Polish deputy, M. Trampczynski, in the Prussian Diet, and M. Seyda, the Polish leader in the Reichstag, pointed out that the number of Poles who had fallen on the German side was higher in proportion to the population of Posen than those of Germany generally in proportion to her total population; and they based on this fact the insistent request that those very severe anti-Polish laws which were about to be put into operation before the war commenced should be immediately abrogated.

Nevertheless it was not to be. The declaration and protest of the Polish leaders attracted a great deal of attention among the rank and file of German public opinion, but, outside the ranks of the Polish deputies themselves, there were at that time no responsible German politicians who believed that the time was opportune for the announcement of any radical change in the spirit and motives of Germany's Polish policy. Only Herr Delbrück, the Secretary of State, took his cue from the Conservative leader Herr Heydebrand, and offered some vague remarks which pointed to a possible inquiry into Polish affairs when the war had been successfully brought to a close.

Undoubtedly the main reason for this studied indifference was the fact that in these early days the centre of gravity for the war was in the West, and that the attention of the German General Staff was almost exclusively directed to the vital operations that were necessary in order to retain any effective hold on French territory. It was not until the spring of 1915 that attention was really shifted to the East, and that the question of annexing Polish territory was raised practically by some of the organs of German public opinion. In fact, as will be seen before this story draws to a close, the German attitude to the future of Poland has varied a great deal according to the exigencies of the military situation. When the stronger of the Central Powers appeared to occupy a secure position, Poland could hope for little; but when the military situation was troubled, then there began to be a talk of possible future amelioration.

About the 20th May 1915, especially, there came

a time when those who championed the cause of Germany felt themselves at a favourable stage of the great European struggle. It was just before the initiation of Mackensen's successful offensive in Galicia. No doubt it had become known in influential circles that Russia was short of ammunition and that a great advance on the Eastern frontier might confidently be expected. Six powerful Agricultural and Industrial Associations presented a memorandum to the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, asking for an annexation of 80,000 square miles in the East, including the governments of Suwalki, Plotzk, Lomza, Warsaw, Kalisz, and Piotrkow. These are all provinces lying along the German line of frontier, and if absorbed into the Fatherland they would constitute a new partition of Poland.

The mere fact that this question had been raised showed that in Germany there were a large number of convinced and enthusiastic annexationists. It requires some consideration in the Fatherland before one can make forecasts for the future, for there is now a law in operation which prohibits all comments on the ultimate consequences of the warlike operations. But notwithstanding this and all similar prohibitions, a number of University professors handed in a memorial to the Chancellor, strongly endorsing the plea that the provinces already occupied by the German Army in Poland should be permanently added to the territories of the Empire. After the second capture of Lwow, when Russian fortresses seemed to be falling like ninepins, this desire for national aggrandizement became more pronounced than ever; even the Committee of the National Liberal Party—not to be behind the times in this patriotic megalomania—handed in to the Chancellor their resolution of the 15th February in which they unhesitatingly laid stress on the need for Eastern expansion.

This does not look like a benevolent desire to benefit Poland; but candour compels us to add that these patriotic annexationists had not everything their own way. Despite all the efforts that were made to warn off opposition and create the impression that German opinion was one and

undivided, it was soon made pretty clear that there were still some thousand men in Germany who had a lurking fear that the vaulting ambition of their country was in danger of overreaching itself. An association called the "Association of the New Fatherland" began to agitate against the dangerous ideas. Outside the Reichstag 140 well-known scholars and politicians prepared a memorial to the Government in which they expressed the opinion that Germany should avoid including within her borders any nations "politically independent or accustomed to manage their own affairs." How far exactly was this memorial intended to go? That it applied to Belgium was certain; but was it also intended to apply to Poland?

The stars in their courses, however, were fighting against these University professors and outside politicians. The German Army had entered on a long spell of almost uninterrupted advance in Russia: Warsaw had fallen. Teutonic forces were making straight for Kovno, Grodno, and Brest-Litovsk. Who could dream of putting a limit to the political ambitions of Germany? Certain organs of the Allied Press were talking of an Austrian or Saxon Prince for the Kingdom of Poland. And in Germany itself the most influential voices were raised again in favour of the complete incorporation of the conquered territory.

Here, however, a new complication was introduced by the action of the Austrian Poles. As is now sufficiently understood in this country, Galicia, or Austrian Poland, is a self-governing unit in the Dual Monarchy, and through its contingent of Galician members to the Reichsrath called the Polish Club it exercises a marked influence on the proceedings of the Austrian Parliament. The Supreme National Council of Galicia had passed a very unpleasant time in Vienna whilst the Russians were in occupation of their country; but no sooner had the tide turned and the Russians begun to retreat than the Galicians communicated with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning the political future of their race. This pertinacity was obviously very embarrassing to the Austrian bureaucrats, and it was not until the end of July that the

memorialists received an official reply of a non-committal character. That was not to the liking of the recipients, and accordingly they issued a long manifesto calling for the union of the whole of Russian Poland with Galicia.

This manifesto was supplemented by a similar appeal from the Polish Club, and there can be no question that there was at that time a considerable portion of the Austrian bureaucracy in favour of it. But the Austrian Ministers had all to keep an anxious eye on public opinion in Germany. There the opinion was not exactly setting in this direction. The journalists of the "predominant partner" had little idea of seeing Poland become a third part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Some of their most influential members bitterly attacked the Poles for the attitude they had assumed, and in many different quarters the view was favoured that the future of Poland was a matter on which the Poles themselves had no right to offer an opinion.

Then came the 19th August 1915, when the German Chancellor referred to Poland in the speech which he delivered in the Reichstag in reply to M. Goremykin, who was at that time Prime Minister of Russia. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, unlike his predecessor, Prince von Bülow, was not, when he accepted his high office, an enemy of Poland; indeed, he showed unmistakable signs of a desire to adopt a conciliatory policy, until the day when he found himself confronted with the stubborn prejudices of many of his supporters. Then he had to change his cue. He sent a famous telegram to the Anti-Polish Ostmark-verein, in which he gave his assent to the old repressive policy which had already and disastrously failed. He sanctioned the first application of the law of expropriation. He asked for a credit of 300 million marks for colonizing Poland. As well expect a leopard to change its spots as imagine that the Chancellor would execute a sudden *volte-face*, and from an enemy become a friend to the national aspirations of the Poles!

As a matter of fact, he never gave much satisfaction to Poland. His references to that country in the August speech may be summed up under three heads. In the first

place, he expressed great esteem and sympathy for the Polish nation which, as he put it, "had so heroically defended itself against Russia." In the second place, he professed to expose what he called the "false promises" of the manifesto of the Grand Duke Nicholas. And, in the third place, he hazarded some vague forecasts of a future just administration, in which the Polish people should collaborate with the Germans, and which at any rate would lead to the appeasement of the German Polish conflict. But he never specifically named the Grand Duchy of Posen. He would not condescend to anticipate the slightest amelioration for the Poles who inhabit German territory. In general principles he was strong and in sympathetic generalizations; but when it came to applying these generalities to the particular circumstances of the particular case, the German Chancellor made use of language which was "mere sound, signifying nothing."

The resulting debate in the Reichstag showed that most of its members had taken the cue from their Chancellor. Not even the speakers of the Roman Catholic Centre could spare a reference to the case of the unfortunate land. One of the Conservative orators—Herr Oertel—did merely touch the thorny subject; but only to assert that his party would not commit themselves on the Polish question but would rather leave a free hand for a later time. M. Seyda, the leader of the German Poles in the Reichstag, evidently felt, when he came to reply, that it was a case of "much cry and little wool." As his single balm of consolation, he could only extract from it the inference that henceforth the freedom of the Polish nationality would be recognized to be in the interests of Germany.

But of course such a vague recognition of the freedom of the Polish nationality could not satisfy the Polish members in the German Imperial Parliament. They wanted practical ameliorations and not philosophical dogma. So they immediately passed a resolution asking for a first instalment of these ameliorations in the shape of liberty for the Polish language in public meetings. But this did not suit the more spacious mind of the Chancellor. Herr Delbrück, on behalf of his official colleagues, made the

reply that the adoption of such a resolution was manifestly impossible for practical reasons. The Provisional Government in Poland was a military government, and no other permanent civil arrangement could be made until the war had come to an end.

This was the last official pronouncement until the 5th April 1916, but from that day to this many things were happening. Negotiations were going on with Austria as to the place of Poland in the Austrian system. The Warsaw Citizen Committee was entrusted with a large amount of autonomous administration. Polish teaching had been introduced into all the schools. The University in the capital city of Poland assumed a Polish hue. But whilst apparently making these concessions to the Poles, the German military authorities at the same time pursued an economic policy which involved the commandeering of immense quantities of Polish grain and potatoes and the confiscation of industrial machines and raw material. The consequence was that large numbers of working-class families were faced with the alternative of starvation, and pressure was put on the skilled worker to emigrate to Germany, so as to release some German workmen for service at the war.

Military considerations ever occupy the first place in German political policy. The authorities were keenly alive to the fact that there are a large number of young men of military age available in Poland, and they were so immersed in the present strategical problem that they could spare no amount of attention for the general future of the country. Yet later on there emerged the definite proposal that, given a complete scheme of military and economic union with Austria, the German Government would consent to the Kingdom of Poland being incorporated, one and indivisible with Galicia, as a third unit of the Hapsburg Monarchy.

It was just at this stage, however, that the question of the future of Poland assumed a remarkable and startling phase which made it especially interesting to Great Britain and her Allies of the West. Involved in the proposal of a Central Zollverein, and considerably widening its scope so far as the future of Poland was concerned, there were two

further propositions which appeared at that time to have won the assent of the leading statesmen of Germany and Austria. The first was that in any solution of the Polish question the Poles as such should have no voice. The second was that the settlement of the Polish question concerned only the three partitioning Powers—Prussia, Austria, and Russia.

The idea involved in this was that Russia, though so far bound to the Western Allies that she could conclude no separate peace with Germany, might yet not be unwilling, in any future peace negotiations, to withdraw the Polish question from the cognizance of the Western Powers. It would not be the first time that the Russian Government has taken up such a position. In 1830 and in 1863 the Tzar and his Ministers used the argument that the settlement of Poland was an internal question to deprecate the expostulations of the British Ministers. It was also perfectly well known to the German Government that nothing definite had then been done by the Russian Ministers to translate the promise of the Grand Duke into some definite proposal of Polish independence. On the 19th June 1915, the Tzar sanctioned the appointment of a Commission for the preliminary examination of any such plans or projects; but after continuing a kind of intermittent existence for about three months, this Commission was finally dissolved. M. Sazonoff's speech on the 23rd February was rather more concerned with the future unity of all the Polish territories than with the means of realizing her political self-existence when that unity had been actually accomplished. M. Sturmer, the Prime Minister, merely added the sentence that it was "the will of the Tzar that Poland should now begin a new period of life in which she shall be guaranteed the free development of her intellectual powers as well as her aspirations in the realm of culture and of economics."

Where nothing had been actively determined the German Government evidently hoped there was scope for diplomatic manœuvre. It has been shown that during the first eighteen months of the war German policy has blown hot and cold to Poland according to the exigencies of the war. In the spring of 1916 the German rulers evidently believed

that they occupied a favourable position for striking a Polish bargain with Russia. Their censor in Warsaw disallowed any polemical reference to Russia in the Polish Press, and suppressed all papers referring to the programme of Polish independence. It was forbidden to print any news of the Polish legions fighting against the armies of the Tzar. More significant than this, when the leading Poles in Warsaw convened a meeting of all the political parties with the exception of the National Democrats, to manifest the unalterable determination of the Poles to obtain national independence, the publication of this resolution was forbidden by the Austro-German authorities, and no pains were spared to prevent its announcement abroad. So conspicuously careful, in fact, was the German Government at that time to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of Russia, that the impression was spread in Poland of the existence of a tacit understanding between the partitioning Powers to secure a fresh partition at the end of the war, and to make the extent of the Russian territory depend on the ultimate result of the military operations.

The Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag on the 5th April 1916 must be understood in the light of these German intrigues. In itself it promised nothing and explained nothing. Like its predecessor of the 19th August 1915, it was conspicuous for wide generality and particular ambiguity. He adopted an acrid tone to Russia. He confidently asserted that "Germany and Austria-Hungary must and will solve the Polish question." But behind this confident and almost boasting spirit there lurked the knowledge, had he only been able to avow it, that the negotiations between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the Customs Union had not been taking the most favourable course. As for his polemical references to Russia, they deceived nobody in the West. Undoubtedly the Chancellor thought that the German armies could hold the territories they at present occupy in the East. Undoubtedly the annexationists in Germany had persuaded him that Polish territory must be annexed, or only yielded to Austria for some special consideration. What, in fact, the Chancellor wanted most of all was that Russia should

consent to make Poland a subject of diplomatic barter in the East, so that the Western Powers should be finally warned off the field.

It was the whole course of events, however, during the spring and summer of last year, that made Germany finally realize that Poland could neither be annexed nor made a subject of private barter between the partitioning Powers. The Allies were undertaking an offensive on every front. Roumania threw fresh forces into the war against the cause of the Central Empires. Germany must have more men, and if she were to get any more men from Poland, Poland must first be placated. So Herr Bethmann Hollweg evidently decided to take the first alternative to German annexation and sound Austria as to whether Galicia could not be thrown into a new separate Polish State, to be ruled by an Austrian Archduke.

Negotiations indirectly followed to attain this result, and the course of such negotiations is necessarily obscure. But sufficient has leaked out about them to make us fairly sure that the German Chancellor first proposed that Austria should agree to a new Polish independent State, including the Kingdom of Poland, Galicia, and that part of Posen where there is a population of over 65 per cent. of Poles. This proposal was apparently defeated because of the opposition of Austria, which persistently claimed, much to the annoyance of the Germans, that not a part but the whole of Posen should be given up to form a province of this new independent State. Countered at this particular point, the Chancellor gave up his intention of dealing with any large part of the ancient Polish Republic and conceived the idea, which apparently still occupies his thoughts, of confining himself to the Kingdom of Poland alone. He offered Austria the prospect of constituting this kingdom a new State under the Archduke Charles Stephen; but as Austria, perhaps not altogether without some unholy satisfaction on the part of the Chancellor, was not at the time playing an exactly brilliant part on the Galician front of the war, he attached to this gift of a crown to an Austrian Archduke the condition that he should be under close German control, both in military and civil matters. "I am

not a member of the House of Wied," is said to have been the incisive comment of the Archduke when he heard of these proposals, and for the time being this bitter pleasantry put an effectual stop to all further negotiations between the Allied Empires.

Germany was now somewhat in a quandary, and it is necessary to appreciate her position with some exactness in order to understand the significance of subsequent events. All her schemes had, up to this time, completely miscarried. The "hot-and-cold" policy had simply revealed her weakness. Annexation was a belated dream of the past. Austria had proved herself no placid negotiator. The Archduke Charles Stephen was unwilling to appear in the rôle of a man of clay. What was to be done? Nothing but for the German Government to continue to limit its schemes to the kingdom—as it was unwilling to deal with Posen as a whole—only to enter into some kind of negotiations with the representatives of the Poles themselves. And it is at this point that our previous analysis of the position helps us most signally to understand the subsequent course of the negotiations. There has been a tendency in Great Britain to underestimate the extent of the German offer to Poland. How could it possibly be genuine? How could the new independent State be other than an insignificant counterfeit? All that Germany wants is men, and to get men she was ready to delude the unsuspecting Poles with all kinds of valueless promises.

Now, it is perfectly true that Germany wants men, and it is perfectly true also that the Chancellor had not suddenly become an enthusiastic convert to the principle of nationalities. Prussianism and the Poles were, and still are, as bitterly opposed as ever; and yet it is easy to see that, not from some access of generous sympathy for national independence, but simply driven thereto by the inevitable logic of events, Germany might be constrained to offer to the Poles a measure of independence which it would be worth their while to accept. It is true that, as the previous course of this narrative has explained, such an offer would be probably limited to the bounds of the kingdom alone; but then the Poles have only to consult history and the

national life of Europe to discover that nations generally begin a course of independent life well within the limits of their full ethnographic boundaries. Why has the cry of Italian Irredentism been raised to-day? Because Italy has not yet expanded to her ethnographic limits. Has even Germany numbered all Germans within one hegemony? And if not Italy or Germany, why should another measure be applied to themselves by the Poles?

Such considerations must be presumed to have been present in the minds of men like Dr. Brudzinski, the very able Rector of the Warsaw University, when they decided to go as a deputation to Berlin to confer with the Chancellor. No explicit details of a promised autonomy had been received from Russia. There was rather a distinct suspicion that the dismissal of M. Sazonoff had disposed of any idea of submitting any proposals for the future of Poland to a special meeting of the Duma. The Polish leaders would have been less than human if, in such circumstances, they had declined to hear what would be said to them on the part of the preponderant Central Empire. They were in no hurry to accept the Chancellor's invitation. They refused to start on the journey until they received some kind of preliminary assurance that the terms the Chancellor might offer would be acceptable to them. When a little later the Chancellor spoke to the Reichstag, his silence about Poland, much commented on at the time, was due to the fact that he was still in doubt as to how far he should succeed in making any preliminary impression on the Poles.

Eventually, however, the first difficulties were overcome and negotiations were opened up. These negotiations lasted a month and involved journeys of the Polish deputation both to Berlin and to Vienna. There was no question of German "Kultur" deluding and deceiving the Polish envoys. They were too wide awake for that. They understood too definitely just exactly what they wanted. In the speech made by Dr. Brudzinski in the name of the deputation, he laid down the following conditions: Firstly, a Regent must be nominated; secondly, the frontier between the two zones of military occupation must be

abolished; thirdly, a Polish State Council must be at once formed to elaborate a Constitution and regulate the administration of the State; and fourthly, a military department must be brought into being to organize a Polish army. As for the exact frontiers of the new State, the deputation were willing to leave the delimitation open until the end of the war; but on every other front they stood inflexibly firm.

Then came the proclamation itself on the 5th November, and it was at once plain that the Polish conditions had hardly been fully met. It indeed promised "an independent State with a hereditary monarchy and constitution," but no regent was proclaimed and no details of the constitution were announced. The Poles, however, received its first reading in the ancient Houses of Parliament with a large amount of enthusiasm; and it is plain from the speeches made at the gala meeting of the Warsaw Municipal Council, that, with all its shortcomings, it was regarded as altering completely the Polish situation by its acknowledgment of two facts. The first and very important one is that referred to in the beginning of this article, that the Polish question is an international question and not simply the concern of the three partitioning States. The second is that, in the opinion of two out of the three partitioning States, some part of Poland is entitled to the grant of a measure of independent life.

How far the international character of the Polish problem had now been brought before the attention of the Western Powers was seen from the fact that an official communiqué issued on 15th November 1916 by the Russian Government, announcing its intention of creating a "complete Poland" enjoying the privilege of freely regulating its "national *intellectual* and *economic* life" on a basis of autonomy under the sovereignty of Russia, was followed by a telegram addressed by the British and French Premiers to their Russian colleague. All Poles look on such a Western move as an acknowledgment of the fact that Poland is an international question.

At the present time, it is certain that Germany is still being pressed to make more definite and satisfactory her

promises to Poland, and he would have ill appreciated the argument of this article who came to the conclusion that there was no probability of her ever satisfying the demand. At the present time quite the most remarkable feature of the international situation is the fact that a large number of the Russian newspapers, without being stopped by the censor, are telling the Russian public that their country is being outmanœuvred, and that some undertaking more definite is needed on the part of Russia and her Allies if the German proclamation to Poland is to be effectively met. It is not sufficient to say that Russia and the Allies would grant a reunited Poland, whereas Germany is only able to deal with the kingdom alone; because, in the first place, the overwhelming preponderance of Polish opinion is in favour of independence as the primary and most indispensable requisite of the future; and, in the second place, it is difficult to see how, on the principles of the Entente itself, "autonomy under the sovereignty of Russia" could ever be imposed on Posen and Galicia without their own antecedent consent.

At the same time, it is perfectly clear that the Poles require first the summoning of a real Diet and Council of State, and that they will not be satisfied with any of the trumpery substitutes hitherto offered by General von Beseler. As a specimen of how this thought is shaping itself, let me cite some resolutions passed at a meeting in Lublin, which will show how far off those who passed them are from making their new State a present to Germany. These Lublin leaders require—(1) A Diet elected on a basis of universal suffrage and possessing full legislative competence, including the right of initiating laws, and possessed of a complete and guaranteed freedom of discussion; and (2) A Council of State, constituted by the Diet, responsible to the Diet in its diplomatic and executive functions and supervising the whole administration. Any Diet or administrative authority which in its powers falls short of these two requisites, they declare to possess *ipso facto* no legal authority; at any rate, they refuse to admit that this is the proper form to be assumed by any really national

State. In this way they rule out all solutions of the Polish problem which put the Polish people of the kingdom directly under the heel of Germany.

Again, there can be no doubt that expression is thus given to the opinion of the overwhelming majority of Poles in the three sundered divisions of the ancient Polish Republic. Poland is fully abreast of the most progressive Western ideas, and by "independence" she does not mean simply freedom of speech or power to regulate her own economic system, not simply the power of administering laws made for her by another, but the free and unfettered liberty to realize her own legislative ideas, the right to raise and control her own army and to manifest her own public policy amid the nations of Europe.

To-day there is in the hands of the Allies a golden opportunity to demonstrate to Poland how far they surpass Germany in their conception of national independence and popular freedom.

The Polish problem, as has been repeated again and again, has now been definitely internationalized; and if only the Poles understood that the Powers of the Entente would acknowledge their independence, they would then work to make it satisfactory according to the most approved Western models. This would mean that Poland could never come under the heel of Germany or degenerate simply into a vassal State. The Russian newspapers are, many of them, writing to-day in favour of such an acknowledgment of Polish independence. Many influential voices in France have lately been raised in the same satisfactory direction. Some important newspapers have, in powerfully reasoned articles, supported this same view in our own country. Whatever be the real motives that inspired it, the German proclamation has revealed itself in these results as a powerful recognition of the rights of nationalities; and the Polish people, who have long worshipped at the shrines of liberty and freedom, may be trusted to make a right use of the independence which they thus attain.

POLES AND GERMANS

By Prince Henryk Woroniecki

The great war which is now raging in Europe has been a great trial to a people who have had to make the heaviest sacrifices on account of a trouble for which they were in no way responsible. That people is the people of Poland. It is sufficient to cast a glance at the Eastern front of the theatre of operations to see that Russian, German, and Austrian armies are trampling continually on the ground of the ancient Polish Republic. It matters not whether it is the north, in the land of the Masurian Lakes, or in the south, in the vast plains of Cracow, or amid the picturesque Carpathians; in one direction or another the most terrible battles are fought on the ravaged lands of Poland. Hundreds of Polish towns and thousands of Polish villages have been either wholly or partially destroyed in the course of the conflict.

What effect will the great European War produce on the future of the Polish people? Ought Poland to be divided between Austria and Germany? Ought it to be wholly annexed to Germany or Austria? Ought it to become independent? It is quite certain that, however pushed to it by motives of policy, the last possibility must please the German Chancellor least. The antagonism during the last century between Poles and Germans has been so strong, and Germany has followed such a dubious policy towards the Poles in Posen, that it seems hardly possible to believe that German statesmen can sincerely work for the complete restoration of Poland unless they are absolutely compelled to do so by great political cataclysms or by the vital interests of their nation. It is only necessary for me to recall again

the story of the struggle between Poles and Germans in Posen during last century to throw a sufficient measure of doubt on the existence of these so-called generous feelings of Germany towards Poland.

I propose in this short article to deal with the hostility between the Poles and the Germans, and to illustrate it by a recapitulation of the methods which the Germans employed to coerce the Polish inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Posen. Humanity has been shocked by the unscrupulous violation of the neutrality of Belgium on the part of the Germans, notwithstanding all their obligations admitted by treaty. But this violation of treaty obligations is no novelty in the history of Prussia. An analogous instance —this time to the detriment of Poland—can be produced from the history of the close of the eighteenth century. In 1790 Poland had concluded a treaty with Prussia and against Russia. Two years later Russia declared war on Poland, and the latter Power asked of Prussia the help which she had bound herself to give. This help was not only refused, but Prussia turned against Poland and, with Russia, participated in the second partition of 1792.

In 1848, when the Poles of Posen rose in rebellion and demanded complete autonomy for their country, the German General Wilbsen, in the name of the Prussian Government, signed at Jaroslawiec a declaration in virtue of which the Poles bound themselves to disband their insurrectionary forces with the exception of about 3,000 men; while, on the other hand, the Prussians bound themselves to give a complete measure of autonomy, with a Polish administration and a Polish army carrying its own emblems and insignia. The Poles kept their word and the insurrectionary forces were disbanded. But the Prussians immediately launched a traitorous attack against the small remaining remnant of these forces, and crushed them under the onslaught of columns seven times more numerous than their own. Needless to say the remaining clauses of the treaty of Jaroslawiec were never put into practice.

In recapitulating the history of Prussian Poland it is necessary to remember that until 1872 the condition of

the Poles, if not enviable, was at any rate tolerable. Frederick William, in his appeal of the 15th May 1815, used these words: "You are incorporated in my monarchy and you have no need to renounce your nationality. You will enjoy the advantages of the constitution which I propose to grant to my faithful subjects, and, like the other provinces of my realm, you will be granted a provincial constitution. Your religion will be respected and its priests will receive a grant according to their position. Your personal rights and your property will be placed under the protection of the law, and for the future you will have a voice in the making of the laws that protect you. Your language will be equally honoured with the German tongue at all public functions. You will be eligible for any public office in the Grand Duchy according to your powers and capacities."

So it was that, until 1872, the Polish language was permissible in the schools, in the administration, and in the courts of law; the Poles occupied public office on the same terms as the Germans. There was even evidence of some sympathy of the German people for the Poles. On the 26th July 1848, the Liberal M.P.'s Rung and Blum tabled a proposal in the Parliament of Frankfort calling on the German Confederation, with the concurrence of France and Great Britain, to convoke an international congress on the question of restoring to Poland her liberty and independence. The debate on this proposal lasted two days, but it was rejected after a speech by one Guillaume Jordan, who appealed to the national egoism of the German mind. The last manifestation of sympathy on the part of the German people towards the Poles took place in 1863, when the Diet of Prussia expressed its indignation that the Prussian Government was virtually lending its help to Russia to suppress the Polish insurrection of that particular year.

One may well ask what was the cause of that sudden change of sentiment which suffered the German Government from 1872 onwards to persecute the Poles. The following reasons may sufficiently explain this change of

front. In the first place, Bismarck had been the victor in three successive wars. In the second place, he had united the smaller States of Germany in one great and powerful Empire; and, in the third place, by granting a democratic suffrage to the new Federation, he induced the great majority of the German people to repose their confidence in himself—the bitter enemy of the Polish people.

It is not difficult to prove the last statement. In the days when there was a good deal of German sympathy for the Poles, and public opinion even contemplated the possibility of the restoration of Polish freedom, Bismarck wrote, on the 20th April 1848, in the *Magdeburg Gazette*:—

> How could a German so far lose himself through hysterical sentimentality and the love of impracticable theories as to cherish the extravagant dream of settling in the near vicinity of his own country a tireless foe whose internal tumults always eventuate in open war, and who will attack us on the flank each time we have a difficulty in the West?

Also, in dealing with a conciliatory Prussian policy towards the Poles, he said:—

> I look on our present policy in Posen as the most regretable example of quixotic behaviour which a State ever indulged in for its own ruin.

A few years later Bismarck himself took the helm of power, and the policy of Prussia was at once changed in accordance with his sentiments. A harsh, cruel, and machiavellian policy took the place of one which was relatively mild and conciliatory. In order the better to understand the causes which led to the anti-Polish laws which began to be promulgated in 1872, I should like briefly to throw the light of day on that German state of mind which could completely refashion itself in the course of forty years. The victories of 1866 and 1870 roused in the mind of Germany the consciousness of irresistible might, the effort to dominate everything and everybody. Force as the ultimate foundation of the State was now the ideal of the German. In dealing with this side of the German character, Henri Lichtenberger said:—

> Can you not see that in this German character, plodding and somewhat commonplace, yet solid and persistent, there has arisen a desire for power, strong, patient, methodical, ready to seek with undaunted perseverance the goal which has once been opened to it, undistracted by caprice or passion, never led aside by a difficulty or an obstacle? The German seeks for power not from any personal desire for advancement or promotion, or for the material advantages which power brings in its train. The German seeks for power in itself, because power is the real measure of the value of a man, a group, a party, or a people.

Nietzsche, in considering a fine sentiment, says :—

> A fine sentiment exalts in man the sentiment of power, the will for power in itself. What is an unworthy utterance? One that has its inspiration in a feeble spirit. We ought not to speak of virtue but of bravery, which is the virtue of the Renaissance, a virtue apart from the moral sentiments.

In another passage Nietzsche expresses himself as follows :—

> If you can show me that harshness, cruelty, stratagems, a bold spirit, the warlike habit of mind, are able to augment human vitality, I shall take small account of their evil and their sinfulness . . . and if I discover that veracity, virtue, goodness—in one word, all the qualities hitherto revered and respected by men—do not promote the expansion of life, I bid farewell to science and to morality.

"Men are only brothers when it is impossible to kill your brother," said one of the precursors of Nietzsche. The celebrated pangermanist historian Henri von Treitschke continually warned his hearers against the "middle-class sentimentalists" who preached kindliness and pacifism; he looked upon such ideas as "dangerous dreams." In one of his unguarded moods he exclaimed: "We are not so far gone that we can be led away by the high-sounding names of tolerance and enlightenment."

Whilst proclaiming in such a way force and power as the ideals and end of life, the German also cherished in

his heart the conviction that all that is German is good. Germany is looked on as set apart for the apostolic duty of leading humanity up the slopes to the summit of perfection, and all the other nations that have shown no desire to associate their fortunes with Germany are only fit to be suppressed and overwhelmed. On the one hand there is the "will for power," to whose inclinations all should bend; and on the other hand there is the idea that Germany is the protagonist of civilization, bringing as its inevitable consequence the deduction that all that is not German should be attacked and ruined without any nice discrimination of the means employed to attain such a result. The Minister of Finances, Rheinboben, in one of his speeches on Polish expropriation used these words: "If we do just what is necessary in our national interest we have no need to disturb our minds by the inquiry whether a so-called 'moral sentiment' is invoked outside the confines of the German territory."

Just take as an example the conflict, which has now lasted for more than forty years, between the Germans, with their enormous resources and their population of 65 millions, and a mere handful of 3½ million Poles. Prince Bismarck conceived the idea of "germanizing the Poles," whatever it might cost; and as language is one of a nation's choicest possessions, he thought he might find the Poles more pliant to his will if he took away from them their mother-tongue. With the assent of the Reichstag he promulgated a law on the 11th March 1872 which repealed the Educational Order of 1845 and substituted German for Polish in the Polish schools. The Polish language might only be taught as an optional subject. Until this law of 1872 the Polish clergy enjoyed the privilege of inspecting the schools; but for fear that the priests might not be inclined to see these Government orders carried out in their full rigour, the inspection of the schools was placed in the hands of new German officials appointed by the Government. This first downward step was followed by a whole series of repressive measures. In terms of the law of 26th October 1872, German was made obligatory in religious teaching in all college classes; and in

virtue of that of 6th October 1872, a teacher after his appointment had to take an oath of allegiance to the King.

By an administrative order of 20th September 1872 the Government further suppressed Polish as the language of instruction in the elementary schools of High Silesia, and this was followed on 24th July 1873 and on 23rd October 1873 by two further orders extending the scope of the prohibition to West Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Posen. To prevent any Polish influences from infecting the schools, the law of 15th July 1886 laid it down that the Government alone should have in its hands the appointment of teachers. On the 7th November 1887 Polish was even suppressed as an optional subject; and, to put the last finishing touch to this series of ordinances, another was issued in 1900 which forbade Polish religious teaching in the lower classes of the elementary schools. This last measure ordered the little Polish children to repeat their catechism and to say their prayers in German, although they had only small proficiency in the language. It was met by strong resistance on the part of the little ones. They showed themselves absolutely unwilling to do these little acts of devotion in a foreign tongue. But the Prussian educational code strongly recommends corporal punishment, and the German masters did not lose any time in applying the rod to their insubordinate pupils.

Here is the record of an incident which happened at the school in Wrzesnia (Wreschen) on the 20th May 1901. On that day the inspector Winter and the head master Koralewsky used the cane to about fifteen children from twelve to fifteen years of age for having refused to repeat their catechism in German. As the cries of the children resounded in the street, the disquieted parents made their way into the school. The public prosecutor decided to indict these parents for disturbance of the peace. Twenty-five of them were summoned to appear on the 17th November 1901 before the criminal court of Gniezno (Gnezen). In the course of the proceedings before the tribunal the medical expert Krzyzanowski gave evidence on the 20th May 1901 that some parents had brought to him about fifteen children who bore severe bruises on their

backs and on the palms of their hands, and he added "that the hands were so inflamed that the children were unable to close them." Other children could not sit because of their bruises and had to remain in bed.

Undoubtedly these children had been punished more severely than the law allowed, and some of them were not only bruised but bleeding. Yet notwithstanding this violation of the law and the positive fact that the accused had used no violence to the men who had assaulted their children, the leader, Nepomucona Piasecka, was sentenced to four and a half years' imprisonment simply for breaking into the school, and the other twenty-two prisoners had fourteen and a half years of confinement distributed among them. It may be interesting to reproduce some sentences from a speech of Piasecka delivered before the tribunal :—

> Last year a travelling showman passed through our village who beat very cruelly his performing bear. The schoolmaster Koralewsky, who noticed this, warned the man against treating the beast in this way. But the bohemian did not seem inclined to pay much attention to the schoolmaster, and Koralewsky went to the police and secured his punishment for cruelty to an animal. When I think of the way in which my children have been treated I say to myself, "If men may not beat their bear, surely they should much more stringently be forbidden to beat my children."

A famous Polish littérateur wrote a few weeks later in the newspaper *Czas* :—

> We find ourselves face to face with an astounding state of affairs. No hand is raised against those who maltreat these little scholars ; not even a word of remonstrance has been heard. The parents of the tiny victims of Prussian educational brutality have been condemned by Prussian tribunals to long years of imprisonment. Why? Because in their indignation and pity they ventured to utter some words of condemnation against such a school and against such brutal teachers.

This affair of Wrzesnia was afterwards the subject of a double interpellation, first at the Reichstag on the

10th December 1901, and afterwards at the Diet of Prussia on the 13th January 1902. No efforts, however, could avail to alter the punishment of the prisoners. Nay, similar incidents to that of Wrzesnia, which I have simply cited as typical, took place sporadically the following year in different parts of Prussian Poland; everywhere children were beaten and their parents mulcted in heavy penalties. Finally, in the autumn of 1906 there commenced a general educational strike of the Polish children. In the *Paris Echo* of 1st September 1906 there was printed the following telegram from Berlin, dated the 31st August:—

> In all the schools of the province of Posen there has broken out a curious strike of Polish children. The question at issue is an old one. The young Poles won't pray in German. Their masters beat them. They continue to be obstinate.

The number of young strikers reached approximately the figure of 100,000; and the strike itself, in spite of all the cruel methods of repression, lasted for almost eight months. "This resistance of thousands and thousands of children," wrote Dr. Victor Nicaise, "constitutes a phenomenon extremely worthy of attention from the point of view of psychology, not to mention at all its political import. Only the two children's crusades of the year 1212 can be compared with it. Apart from them it is an event absolutely unique." Henri Welschenger gives us the following description of the persecutions of children during the strike:—

> Crying and sobbing came from children beaten and bruised by masters now suddenly changed into beasts; groans and lamentations of mothers who saw their little ones emerge from school marked by bruises and covered with blood; punishment for those who merely dared to protest; imprisonment for any one who simply cursed the cruel executioners; forcible punishment with handwhips, cat-o'-nine-tails, cane or stick, boxes, blows, kicks, tearing the hair or branding with the poker, administered in such a vigorous and brutal fashion that they led to syncope, sickness, and in some cases even to death; all continued because the order of the day was to strike and kick, to lash and to beat; to annihilate opposition by blows

and to crush the smallest semblance of resistance. Were these all? No, assuredly! To violence was added the infliction on the children of subtler penalties and disabilities. Some were sent to penitentiaries, some were put back to lower classes; some were forbidden access to special or secondary schools. The only consoling fact amid all this monstrous cruelty was the invincible spirit of the parents, their energy, and their endurance, worthy of the best and highest traditions of the Polish nation. Nothing could shake them—neither threats, nor imprisonment, nor even exile from their native land. Pangermanists and Hakatists had dashed themselves against a rock which no earthly power could move.

I need add nothing to this vivid and heartrending description of the sufferings of the Polish children. But to enable the reader to get a complete idea of the situation I add descriptions of certain additional features from Polish, French, and German newspapers :—

At Mogelno the children would not reply in German. They were beaten and taken in custody without result. When released from prison they went to pray in the church.—*Dziennik Poznanski*, 3rd November 1906.

A pupil named Tomaszewska fainted under his severe punishment, and only regained consciousness after he had been carried home. A doctor who was hastily called in reported to the authorities that the punishment had passed beyond all the limits prescribed by the law.—*Slovo*, of Warsaw, 16th November 1901. Also *Le Gaulois*, 3rd December 1901.

A German female teacher of the name of Brettschreider inflicted punishment on a little child of nine years named Josephine Jazkowska. The little one died a few days afterwards of cerebral inflammation.—*Goniec Wielkopolski*, 15th November 1906.

On Thursday, 7th November 1907, a little scholar named Antoine Kempenski, the son of a farmer of Jankowo Przygodzkie, went as usual to the school. The master struck him on the head with his cane. The boy had to go home and take to bed, complaining of headache and giddiness. After an hour or so he became unconscious. The next day the doctor found him still unconscious and showing signs of cerebral inflammation and internal hemorrhage. The child died during the course of the following night. The commissioner of police and the educational inspector of the

district allowed two days to pass before they made any inquiry into the affair. Other children gave evidence that the master often struck them on the head. An inquest was held, but the master was only suspended from his duties.—*Kurjer Poznanski*, 13th December 1907.

Surely such facts are sufficient to show the character of the outrages perpetrated by the exponents of Kultur on the children of Poland. They could be added to indefinitely, but I am willing to rest my case on those I have cited. It must not be forgotten, however, with what stoicism these young Polish heroes endured these heavy blows. The *Dziennik Poznanski* of 29th August 1906 tells us that while the boy Pampuch was being beaten, he cried out to his persecutors: "Your blows will not kill me. I shall pray in the language I can understand. Punish me as much as you please, you will not compel me to say my prayers in German." In the same newspaper of the date 29th November 1906 is found the following paragraph: "At Sokola Gora a man named Klunak, fearing to be removed from the mayoralty, ordered his boy to answer in German. The following day the boy persisted in using Polish at the school, and told the teacher that, in spite of the order of his father, he felt himself a Pole, and that he was willing to suffer like the rest for his country and his faith. Another little one, questioned about his punishment, answered: "We are proud of the marks we bear on our bodies." So cruelly were these children persecuted that there were amongst them some cases of suicide. One hanged himself on a tree. Another lay before a train. The latter was lifted away just in time, but he declared before the inspector and two witnesses that he preferred death to a Prussian school.

What is the meaning of all this suffering and trouble? These blows were inflicted simply because the children would not pray in German—a language which they only partially understood. The Rev. Stychel, one of the Polish deputies in the Reichstag, relates that one day he met a little herdsman in the fields. He made him say a prayer in German. The boy mechanically obeyed, hat

on head and stick held in his hand. Then the abbé asked him to pray in Polish. The little one put his stick on the ground, took off his hat, went down on his knees, and offered up a prayer with joined hands and head reverently inclined to the skies. On the 1st June 1851 Bismarck wrote to his wife: "To-day I went to the French church. I cannot speak French to my God and Saviour. My thoughts do not then come freely." The very same Bismarck who admitted that he could only pray in his mother-tongue was the statesman who inaugurated this educational regime in Posen to compel the Polish children to learn their catechism in German. "Ask a German to pray in French," says Henri Welschenger, "you will see what answer he will make. And yet these are the very same people who deliberately violate the most sacred rights of the conscience, and see in the ensuing natural resistance only an unjustifiable rebellion."

The forces engaged in this fight for a mother-tongue were not well matched. On one side there were 100,000 innocent children, and on the other a Government controlling a powerful administrative system, maintained by 65 million people. After eight months of strenuous conflict the strike came to an end, and it was the parents of the children on strike—continually harassed, as they were, by the Government—who eventually ordered the young heroes to lay down their arms. "We wish to announce to you the end of the strike," wrote a father of Barcin to the authorities. "We are faced with absolute poverty. It is on this account and against our inclinations and our conscience that we have ordered our children to make no further resistance. When we told them our decision, the tears filled their eyes."

. . . . .

Again, the German authorities conceived the idea that it was hardly right for the Empire to have upon the soil of Prussian Poland any Poles who were not German subjects. This was what led to the order of the Minister Puttkamer of 26th March 1885 requiring the expulsion from these Polish provinces of all who were unnaturalized.

A general round out of all Russian or Austrian Poles began therefore in April 1885, and there was no quarter even for old men and children. People who had lived for some ten years on German territory received the same treatment as those who had recently settled. Thus it was that, according to the *Königsberger Heutungsche Zeitung*, 1,500 people were expelled from the town of Königsberg and 200 from the little town of Chelmno. Altogether 30,000 people were hustled out before the end of 1885.

Next the Government discovered that it would be advantageous for the German Empire to give new German names to the Polish towns and villages. In this campaign, and during the years 1875–77, more than two hundred places were thus changed in name. Several attempts were even made to change the names of persons in public functions.

On the 19th April 1908 a new law was voted, forbidding the use of a non-German language at meetings in any districts where less than 60 per cent. of the people spoke that other tongue. Article 12 of the law of public meetings lays down the proposition that in districts inhabited by a non-German-speaking population which, according to the latest census, includes more than 60 per cent. of the total inhabitants, a non-German language may be used for twenty years from the passing of the law, that is, until 15th May 1928. This drastic law, which in districts where 45 per cent. of the people were Polish forbade them to use their tongue at public meetings, and which aimed at totally suppressing the use of Polish in public by the year 1928, was voted—a characteristic event—with the full assent of the German Liberals, that is, of men who "in theory" were opposed to the exterminating policy, but who "in practice" would barter their opinions for a few concessions made to them by the Government.

The end of the Government in all this was to Germanize the Polish provinces, and the more thoroughly to accomplish this result, Bismarck suggested the colonization of the Polish lands by men and women of purely German birth.

On the 28th January 1886, Bismarck inaugurated this new policy of Thorough with the following words :—

> The question is asked whether Prussia in her own interest and in that of the Empire will not be obliged by circumstances to disburse 100 million thalers to acquire the possessions of the Polish nobles, or, to speak plainly, in order to expropriate that same nobility. This appears a monstrous proposition, but when it is remembered that we expropriate for a railway, or to construct a fort, or to make a new street, or to make a port, or to reconstruct Hamburg, why should not a State be also entitled to expropriate in certain circumstances to guarantee the public peace and to secure tranquillity in the future? Is not public peace more than commerce? Is it not more important even than the fortification of a single place? There is no injustice[?] because we pay compensation, and these dispossessed gentlemen may be very happy to buy land in Galicia or on the Russian side of the border with the money they receive.

This mode of argumentation convinced the Parliament, and a Commission on Colonization was appointed with a subvention of 100 million marks. This commission was to buy lands from the Poles and sell them to German colonists. The pangermanists, with the "Ostmarkverein"[1] at their head, thought the sacrifices hitherto made had not been sufficient, and accordingly the funds of the Commission were increased on the 20th January 1898 from 100 million to 200 million marks. On 1st July 1902 these funds were still further increased from 200 millions to 350 millions of marks, and a special grant of 100 million marks was earmarked " to buy lands, domains, and forests." In all, 450 millions of marks were granted by the State during the period 1886–1902 to complete the work of colonization. Bismarck had, however, reckoned without his host when he imagined that this work of colonization would be easy. A great conflict, in fact, was the result

[1] The Ostmarkverein, or Society of the Eastern Frontier, was founded in 1894 by Hansemann, Kennemann, and Tiedemann (from whose initials the Poles invented the word "hakatist"). The society had the one object of completely Germanizing the Polish provinces. It disposed of large funds, and on 1st July 1907 it reckoned 45,500 members.

between Poles and Germans. Land which in 1886 fetched 568 marks on an average per hectare went up, in consequence of this competition, to 1,508 marks in 1907.

The Poles, seeing themselves attacked so ruthlessly by Germanism, set up a lively opposition. Whoever sold his land to a German was regarded as a traitor and unhesitatingly boycotted by his fellows. Notwithstanding its ample funds, the Commission of Colonization was only able during the years 1886–1906 to buy 325,993 hectares, of which 103,057 only were really Polish. This loss of Polish land, too, was amply compensated by land bought back by the Poles from German owners. In this way from 1896 to 1906 the Poles recovered some 75,437 hectares from Germans, because the latter could not resist the temptation to benefit from the increased prices which could then be obtained. The Commission, in one of their reports, made vehement complaints about this, and showed how German proprietors offered their lands to them at absurd prices, threatening at the same time that, if the offer were not accepted, they would sell their lands to Poles.

In spite, then, of the large subventions made by the State, the work of colonizing the Polish lands went on very slowly. During the years 1886–1906 only 11,957 German families, representing about 100,000 German immigrants, were settled in accordance with the intentions of the law. The Polish peasants combined, and with the aid of their banks acquired so many parcels of land that the efforts of the German Commission were entirely counterbalanced. In order to counteract this, a new law was promulgated on the 10th August 1904 which forbade the Poles to build houses on lands thus bought. Here is how this fresh statute was expressed:—

> Any person desirous of building a new house, or of transforming any existing erection, standing apart from any ground on which a series of houses are built, into a house, can only do so with the consent of the administrative authorities of his district; or in the case of the urban areas, with the consent of the police authorities. Such authorization is directed to be refused in the districts covered by the law of 26th January 1886 relative to German colonization, that is, in the provinces

> of Western Prussia and Posen; except in the event of a certificate having previously been obtained from the President of one of the said districts affirming that the erection of such a new house would not be in contravention of the objects of the said law.

It goes without saying that of the many thousand demands for authorization deposited by the Poles in accordance with the law not one has been granted. And yet the Polish peasant has such a strong attachment to the soil that he is not disheartened by this legal chicanery. He will buy a plot of land, and not being able to build a house on it, he seeks a lodging with one of his neighbours. A certain number of peasants even bought temporary houses, the invention of one of their number, a peasant named Drzymala. Eventually, however, the Prussian Government forbade the peasants to dwell in these portable houses, but though expulsions were the order of the day, none of these laws were strong enough to quell the free spirit of the Poles. The greater the unjust coercion, the more the ardour of the Poles grew strong to meet it.

It was then, in 1908, that the Government brought forward in the Reichstag a law of expropriation. Prince von Bülow in the Upper House used the following language on the 30th January 1908 in reference to the measure :—

> It is not with a light heart that the Government has made up its mind to expropriate the Poles. This painful decision has only been come to when all other means have proved a failure. Such a law as this is a grave menace to property, but the good of the State is far superior to the interest of the individual. People talk of the nation or "the public interest." It is impossible to compress within legal terms the definition of the public interest. In this particular case the public interest can only be satisfied by expropriation. The law is stigmatized as immoral. But *morality must bend* to the public interest, which is the only veritable morality in State affairs. For the rest, expropriation is a weapon of defence, not one of attack. [?]

I cannot resist the temptation to quote certain other expressions of the Chancellor, which characterize very

neatly the German spirit. "We live upon the earth, and on the earth one must either be a hammer or an anvil." In another of his franker moods the Chancellor continued that "If you can't be sure of making a man love you, you can, at least, make him fear you."

A Conservative member spoke as follows in the ensuing debate :—

> You say that you Poles desire not war but peace. Gentlemen, war with you is not very pleasant for us. But do you call it peace when your thoughts are hostile to the Prussian State? You have been under our rule for 136 years, and yet you still say to us :—
>
> The hills may bear a German name,
> Our hearts are His from whence they came.
>
> Gentlemen, if you can't give us your hearts, neither will you have our land! It is a matter of life and death that you should carry a Prussian heart. In Prussia and Germany, where the frontiers are so exposed, it is impossible to submit to the risk of a Polish revolt, perhaps owing to political complications in Russia or Austria, and at a time when the German arms are busy elsewhere. The State calls on you to admit that the hegemony of the House of Hohenzollern over the annexed provinces of Poland is final and not temporary. Universal history teaches that States have been founded by force and the rule of the strongest. Behind you is the Polish Republic, which has disappeared for ever. Before you is the Prussian State, which has not yet accomplished its mission in the world. Your welfare and peace are bound up with the Prussian State.

After this debate the Government exhibited no qualms of conscience in proposing a law which ran right counter to Articles 4 and 9 of the Prussian Constitution. Article 4, in terms of which "all Prussians are equal before the law," was then explained as meaning: "Every Prussian, of any rank and class, must render obedience to the law." Article 9 declares that property is inviolable and cannot be expropriated unless public necessity—and then only in a very urgent case—strictly requires it. In this case the Prussian administration evidently considered that public necessity was really in question, and that—to use

their own official language—"the resettlement of the German element on the marches of the east is a question of life and death for the Prussian State."

On the 20th of March 1908, in spite of most vehement protestations from the Poles, a law was passed making it possible for the Commission of Colonization to expropriate the Polish lands, and the money at the disposal of the Commission for this purpose was increased by 250 million marks. Here, then, we find ourselves in this twentieth century in presence of a law which completely disregards the rights of a perfectly peaceful population of almost four million souls! Not a single Pole in Prussia could be certain of the future! Any day he might be driven from the lands which for many centuries past had given sustenance to his ancestors.

Such, in its broadest outlines, is the story of the relations between Poles and Germans during the century which has passed and gone. Will this story become different as the result of the war? Will the future relations be better or worse? Is not the final answer to all these questions on the lap of the gods?

POLAND AND EUROPE

By Polonus

I

At last the Polish question seems to be becoming officially what it has never ceased to be in reality—a European question. It is now receiving the same amount of attention as the questions relating to Serbia, Armenia, Montenegro, and Albania—even as those relating to the Trentino and Trieste. The French official press—the most timid in the world—regales its readers with Poland, and the severe military censorship in that country interposes no obstacles. The Third Republic—almost incredible to relate—recognizes the European character of this whole problem. It is true that, three hundred years ago, Henry III of Valois was a king of Poland: that the three last Bourbons, Louis XVI, Louis XVIII, and Charles X, were grandchildren of Leszczynski and Augustus, the two kings of Poland before the last. It is true also that Kosciuszko was nominated a French citizen by the Legislative Assembly, and that the Warsaw revolutionists proclaimed Lafayette an officer of the Polish National Guard. It is true besides that Napoleon twice led his Grand Army to the Vistula and mobilized all Europe for the reconstitution of Poland. But by our contemporary France, as also by Great Britain, the European obligation of the Polish question has long ago been written down as a chimera. It remained so even after the proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicolas or the declaration of M. Goremykin, and it was only a recent speech of M. Sazonov that appeared again to restore it to its place among the orders

of the day. It would, however, be unjust to set this apparent indifference to the discredit of France or Great Britain alone. It is a good long while since the Polish question lost its European character for the mind of Europe as a whole. The two groups of Powers which are now at war agreed at least in this, that they both degraded the Polish question to that of an internal problem concerning the three partitioning States. One side looked on it as a Russian question, the other as a German question, but neither of them looked on it as a question strictly international.

That is why before the present great European conflagration, statesmen and publicists everywhere observed silence about the fate of Poland. On the very eve of the war there was much talk of the British Naval Estimates, of the three years' service in France, and of the latest contingent of Russian recruits. Public opinion was occupied with the constitution of the five Balkan States, the organization of Albania, the neutrality of Belgium, the aspirations of Italian and Serbian irredentists, the affairs of Morocco and Lybia, of Persia and of the Baghdad railway, and of Mongolia and the Chinese Republic. In fact, all subjects were interesting except that of Poland. Any Poles who, before the war, tried to attract attention to Poland at Petrograd, Berlin, or Vienna, or even at Paris, London, or Rome, were regarded pitifully as fanatics, if not as fools. Had people really the time to occupy themselves seriously with the lot of Poland? This was not only a merely local question, but it was out of the way and out of date. It was a thing of naught, a weariness of the flesh. Its insignificance was only thrown into bolder relief by the great world-wide conflagration of the war. And yet events ultimately showed that the very opposite was the case. The eastern front, running for over 700 miles over the Polish-Lithuanian borders of the late Republic, soon attracted the largest share of attention. The most outstanding result of the war has been the occupation of more than 120,000 square miles of Polish territory, with the capitals of Warsaw and Vilna, all snatched by one antagonist from

the other, who had held it for more than a hundred years. The Polish question, once despised and banned, has now regained its great European importance, not by the voluntary choice of either of the two contending parties, but simply by the logic of events and by its importance for the course of the war.

In this respect, as in many others, the present war strangely recalls the epoch of Napoleon. Then, also, men talked of many foreign, far-off problems, very far removed from the fate of Poland. There were the questions of Italy and Spain, of Hanover and Turkey, of Finland and Oldenburg. There were also those of the Concordat and of the Confederation of the Rhine, of Egypt and Louisiana, of an expedition to the Indies and of the continental blockade. And yet out of them all it was only the Polish question, so long overshadowed by the rest, despised and misconceived, represented only by a few thousand tattered Polish legionaries—it was this Polish question alone which finally leapt into the front rank and, becoming the touchstone and the stumbling-block of Napoleonic Europe, decided its destinies in its last hour of military and political trial. That mighty conqueror who once had disposed of the destinies of the world, who had marched triumphantly into Cairo, Milan, Vienna, Berlin, Madrid, and Moscow, as he recalled, in the hour of death, his former grandeurs and successes, recognized that the culminating hour of his efforts and his destinies had been the disastrous "campaign in Poland"—a campaign of which Poland was the cause and aim: the cause owing to her partitions, the aim that she might be reconstituted again.

"That war"—they are the very words of Napoleon at St. Helena—"ought to have become the most popular of modern times. It was a common-sense war to defend real interests; a war to secure the repose and security of all. It was neither revolutionary nor chauvinist, but entirely European and continental. Its success would have meant a new balance of Powers, a series of fresh combinations to avert the dangers of the time and to open up the prospect of future tranquillity." And what was needed to secure such a desirable success? Only "the

re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland as a buffer State." For, again to quote the words of Napoleon, "the future of Europe really depends on the ultimate destiny of Poland." "Had success smiled on me, I should have shrunk from no sacrifices in order to make Poland a separate and independent kingdom, and so long as that result was achieved, it does not matter much who is the actual king, whether enemy, friend, or ally." "I should even have consented to a Russian archduke, although it is very certain he would soon have asked help from me to combat his own country, Russia." But in any case, whether in one way or another, there would have been achieved an event of the first importance, so inevitable and necessary for the peace of Europe and the world, "the reconstitution of Poland, that veritable keystone of the European arch."

These were the sentiments of a great European, and he put his finger on the ailing part. This great expert understood Europe as no one has understood it either before or since. The formation of States and nations has been effected in Europe after a long course of natural development and of organic selection. Without doubt, the mechanical element of force has not been entirely absent. Yet in the main, and at the close of the account, reconstructive influences such as the configuration of territories or the moral principles of the people, have at length triumphed. In the policy of Europe, the great Polish Republic, inhabited by the great Polish people, has grown great by a process of organic evolution more characteristic than most and less tainted by any presence of force or violence. The fact is, Poland became for Europe a political asset of the first importance: it was the centre of gravity of the eastern front of Europe, a real "keystone of the vault," a link and also a buffer between two worlds, the Teutonic—Western, and the Slavonic—Eastern. All at once, by a brutal act of violence, the link was broken. A yawning void was at once made manifest. An essential organ was removed from the body politic, and the bleeding wound was at such a vital part that permanent injury was done to the health of the whole European organism, the

results of which are apparent even to our own day. Add this source of mortal injury to all the other faults and failings of the complex body corporate, showing itself now and again in divers ways and in a varied series of events, and you discover the nature of the hopeless malady which has poisoned all the Governments of Europe, to break out at last under the horrid aspect of a great world-war.

II

Before its partition, the Polish kingdom extended over more than 280,000 square miles, and embraced within its area 13,000,000 inhabitants. In the course of the three partitions (1772, 1793, 1795), Russia annexed about 200,000 square miles with 7,000,000 inhabitants; and Prussia and Austria, each of them, about 70,000 square miles, with 3,000,000 inhabitants. In this fashion Russia augmented her population by one-fourth, Prussia more than doubled her territory, while Austria benefited less by comparison than any of them. The third demarcation, subjecting Vilna and Luck to Russia, Warsaw and Posnau (Posen) to Prussia, Cracow and Lwow to Austria, ruined Poland not only politically, but also from the standpoint of economics, ethics, and the principle of nationality. Ethnographic Poland was cut in twain by the Prusso-Russian and Austro-Russian frontier, and the very heart of the country, under the walls of the capital city of Warsaw, was broken by the Austro-Prussian frontier. This whole design was not worked out without malice aforethought. The scalpel which had been applied to this victim of vivisection was expected not only to destroy the State, but also to put an end to the existence of the Polish nation.

The partition was beneficial to each of the three accomplices; although so far as territory and population are concerned, the land was unequally divided. Needless to say, all the three of them were dissatisfied. Indifferent to the moral crime, they soon came to recognize that, though they appeared to have made a good bargain, they had really made a big political mistake. The mistake,

which no gain could counterbalance, consisted in the fact that each of the three had substituted for an inoffensive neighbour, Poland, the more dangerous companionship of one of his own powerful accomplices. To Austria and Russia a Prussia doubled in territory became a dangerous neighbour. More formidable still to Austria and Prussia, Russia planted her huger bulk on their flanks, with more territory indeed but with her covetousness still unsatisfied. It was Russia, undoubtedly, that had gained from the partition the most substantial slices of territory, but even these were less than the undivided Poland which she had originally hoped to annex. In past days she had tried to attain her end by promoting for the throne of Poland, after the death of Sigismund Augustus, the last of the Jagellons, the candidature of Ivan the Terrible; and again after the death of Stephen Batory she proposed Feodor through the agency of Godunow. It was a question then of the Russo-Polish union on a basis of equality. From the same point of view, Peter the Great was deaf to the first suggestions for a partition which came from Frederick William I, because he preferred to secure the whole of Poland for himself or for his son Alexis. Already there had, however, crept into the idea of a union the suggestion of subjection. Finally, however, under the reign of Catherine II the decadence of Poland and the aggrandizement of Russia had become so manifest, that the design of annexation, the so-called "unification," was deemed to be politically ripe. At the same time two obstacles presented themselves to bar its complete accomplishment. In the first place, there was the physical impossibility for a State of only twenty-five million people, as Russia was then, to absorb the whole bulk of the Polish Republic; and in the second place, there was the covetous spirit of the powerful neighbours around. Nothing remained for Catherine to do but to resign her mind to the compromise of the partition wherein, taking to herself the lion's share of the gains, she at the same time yielded up the rest, the very heart of ethnographic Poland, to Prussia and Austria. And yet at the core

of her being Russia made no real renunciation of her ambitions; she still retained her original hope of annexing the whole of Poland. That was, at any rate, the aspiration of Souvorow; for, after taking Warsaw by storm, he obstinately declined to render it up to Prussia. On different occasions Catherine herself cherished the design of snatching Lwow from Austria. So it was that the partition did not take long before it appeared abortive to the accomplices themselves, and with no guarantee of principle and permanence. They were, in fact, the first to understand that the partition was "worse than a crime—it was a blunder." It was because they were alive to this that they were anxious to go back on the past before the partition, even before they had succeeded in making their final decision. Each accomplice wanted it all done over again, and taxed his ingenuity to find a way in which the new operation should redound more to his profit and to the detriment of the other two conspirators. Characteristically, too, they each of them suspected the other, so much so that they hastened to guard themselves against their mutual machinations. By a secret clause of the Treaty of 1797, they made a solemn covenant that "in order to remove everything that might recall the existence of the kingdom of Poland when her body politic has been destroyed . . . the three high contracting parties bind themselves never to use in their official vocabulary the general name of the Kingdom of Poland—a name which now and for ever must be suppressed."

This partition was finished just as if Great Britain and France had never existed. The rivalry of these two Powers had rendered such a consummation possible; in their mutual recriminations they mutually neutralized the other. Not only so, but they were afflicted with blindness and did not perceive the European significance of the partitions, though it was not long before they were fated to feel their effects. Concluded without their leave, this annexation of territory larger than the whole German Empire of our own days completely upset the whole balance of the European system, to the profit of their partners but to the loss of the two passive witnesses

in the West. Great Britain was the first of the Western Powers to discover this in the course of events. Russia, in concert with Prussia, declared against her during the American War, and issued the famous Declaration of armed maritime neutrality. Then she followed this up by seizing the Crimea with the assistance of Austria, thus attacking Turkey and fixing her eye on Constantinople. It was at this particular time that there was conceived and formulated the first Russian project of an Indian invasion. Pitt the younger, who was then the British Premier, was the first Englishman who recognized that all these events were something in the nature of an aftermath from the partitions of Poland; and accordingly he was the first to see that an independent Poland was a vital concern of British policy. In 1791 he was ready to fight with Poland against Russia, but home troubles turned his attention from this design, which finally he had to abandon owing to his campaign against revolutionary France. The latter country, too, had begun to experience the harmful consequences of the Polish partition. The copartnership for the ruin of Poland transformed itself into a copartnership for the subjection of France. So long as these coalitions were only Austro-Prussian, Austro-Russian, or Prusso-Russian, France could successfully withstand them; but France was overwhelmed when the old triple copartnership was revived and the coalition became Austro-Prussian-Russian.

Napoleon was the first Frenchman who perceived the connection of these events—the first who understood the essential interest which France has in the resurrection of an independent Poland. That was why he began by reconstituting the Duchy of Warsaw in the part of Poland taken from Prussia; and then he rounded it off with Western Galicia and Cracow, taken from Austria. At last, however, he was obliged to admit failure, in 1807, in 1809, and in 1812, in his effort to snatch her prey from Russia. Thus it came about that, in 1813, there were placed temporarily in the victorious hands of the Russians, Vilna, Dantzig, Warsaw, Posen, Cracow—that is to say, with the exception of Lwow, nine-tenths of the

whole old Polish Republic. Never, until our own time, has Russia possessed so much of Poland; and even at the beginning of 1915, if she had conquered Lwow and Przemysl, she had lost Kalisz and Lodz. In 1813 all the Prussian part of the partition was absorbed. To rescue as much of it as possible, Prussia forwarded to Russia the plan, then rejected but since immortalized, of General Knesebeck, and that was to trace a strategic frontier at the Vistula–Narew–Niemen line. Russia reluctantly yielded assent to a very much abridged version of these Prussian claims. On the other hand, she had not the slightest idea of handing over any part of this conquered territory to reconstitute an independent Poland. It was her object, on the contrary, to retain as much of it as she could, even if under the slenderer form of a dynastic union. Such views, however, at the Congress of Vienna, ran athwart that covetousness of Austria and Prussia which suited with the old selfish blindness of Britain and France. All these Powers tried in every sort of way to restore the Third Partition pure and simple, or at any rate some other partition which would come very near to it. And whilst secretly cherishing the fatal and murderous design of entirely dividing and subjugating Poland as it emerged after the Third Partition, they all the time publicly proclaimed a grand and reinvigorating programme—to restore a reunited Poland to its independence such as it was before the First Partition. By such unworthy equivocations they influenced the deliberations and deceived the opinion of Europe and of the Poles. The final result, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was a compromise. Henceforth the Russian part of the partitioned State was to comprehend 220,000 square miles of territory, the Austrian part about 30,000 square miles, and the Prussian part about 20,000 square miles.

The Duchy of Warsaw, after having yielded up Posen to Prussia, was established as a constitutional kingdom attached to Russia; while independence was given to the tiny Republic of Cracow. Yet although it was thus mutilated and deprived of independence, the new Kingdom of Poland occupied a much more favourable position

than it did after the Third Partition. Name, nationality, and the attributes of a State were restored to the country. It possessed a Government, courts of law, a treasury, and an army. What was even more essential, and despite the fact that it had lost Posen and Vilna and Cracow, the new kingdom had, at any rate, been saved from the deadly vivisection which had made the Third Partition run through the ethnographic heart of Poland. This living heart was now left beating for all Poland and a symbol of the nation's imperishable unity. Surely this was no ephemeral result of the self-sacrifice of the days of Kosciuszko, or of those Polish legions which bore themselves bravely on the side of Napoleon. This territorial integrity of the kingdom has remained even when the country has been deprived of its legal rights as a State; it has lasted for a whole century and enabled the Polish nation to survive throughout the century as well. It is the last remnant of our former existence, an invaluable minimum, bought at a heavy price. He who cherishes designs against their territorial integrity, whatever be his methods and whatever be the indemnities which he promises in return, is simply striking at Poland with the assassin's dagger which was used in the old partitions in the hope that it may thereby end her existence as a separate land. It may be Russia when she gives Poland the official name of "the provinces of the Vistula" or breaks off Chelm and Suwalki from the rest of the country; it may be Prussia and Austria if they intend to perpetuate their present provisional division of their occupied territory. Whether it be now or in past days, all who cherish such designs are the mortal enemies of Poland.

The reduction of the Kingdom of Poland effected at the Vienna Congress had no small share in bringing about the failure of the Polish revolution of November 1830. The fortunes of battle, so long uncertain in the Polono-Russian War of 1831, would have doubtless declared themselves on the side of Poland if the latter had not been deprived of Posen and Cracow—that is to say, of about a quarter of its territory. Add to this that the attitude of the rest of Europe to this revolution constituted a new

injustice. It is true that the popular suffrages, in Britain, in France, in Germany, and even the resolutions of the Hungarian County Councils, inclined to the Polish cause. But the Governments of these countries took a different line. Prussia vouchsafed to Russia her most active help, reckoning that she would be rewarded by the concession of the Knesebeck line. And she very nearly succeeded in her design. There is still preserved in the archives of Petrograd a pencil note in the hand of Nicholas I written, apparently, under the impression that Poland would be successful; and in this note he cedes to Prussia all the territories of the kingdom to the west of this line. Count Orlow, the Adjutant-General of the Czar, even made known the contents of this note at Berlin through the agency of the Prussian General, von Hindenburg, who was then stationed on the frontier. But when the contest took a turn favourable to the Russians, there was then no more question of such a cession. Marshal Paskiewitch, the future Lieutenant-Governor of Warsaw, did not approve of it, or demanded as a *quid pro quo* the whole of Western Galicia. Yet the services rendered by Prussia in this acute crisis strengthened for a long term those ties which bound her to Russia, and which were otherwise established by the dynastic relationship between Frederick William III and his son-in-law Nicholas I, and later between William I and his nephew Alexander II. The Austria of Francis I, at once flattered and threatened by Russia, also adopted a deferential attitude to Prussia. Prince Metternich, by a course of diplomatic duplicity, deceived the revolutionary Government of Warsaw, and did his best to make tools of them for the use of the Tzar Nicholas. The Western Powers in their own fashion came also to the help of Russia. Just as, in former days, Fox and the Whigs had helped Catherine II when they prevented Pitt from countenancing the Polish reform of May 1791, so also the Whig Government of Lord Grey, unduly compliant to Nicholas I, refused to render any help to the Polish revolution of November 1830. Louis Philippe went still farther in the wrong direction. In order that he might be officially recognized by Russia, he betrayed the secrets of the Polish

revolution by sending in copies of his correspondence with Poles in Paris and London. When the revolution was at last suppressed he declared that "order reigns at Warsaw." Lastly, the suppression of the Constitution of the Polish kingdom by the Tsar was carried through without any real opposition—although there were some hollow and disappointing notes of protest sent by the Cabinets of France and Britain with no other design but that of deceiving the public opinion of the two countries.

Not less disappointing, at a later date, were the protestations of M. Guizot and Lord Palmerston after the Galician Jacquerie of 1846, and after the suppression of the free city of Cracow by Austria—the latter act of violence even finding a defender in the British House of Commons in the person of the young Disraeli. About the same time the Polish problem was again elevated to the rank of an international question at that "springtime of nations" the year 1848, and afterwards in 1854, at the Crimean War.

Finally, and for the last time until our own days, Poland was debated on the European forum during the insurrection of January 1863. On this latter occasion Prussia also ranged herself openly on the side of Russia, and that for three reasons. In the first place she desired to get into the good grace of Russia, in order to provide against future conflicts with Austria and France. In the second place, she kept her eyes obstinately fixed on the coveted frontier of Knesebeck; and in the third place, she was equally and desperately opposed to the autonomy and independence of Poland. Prince Bismarck went so far as to say that the Marquis Wielopolski, the promoter of Polish autonomy under the Russian sceptre, designed to league the country with France and inaugurate a Pan-Slavic league against Prussia of which the Polish realm would be the pivot; and that the chiefs of the revolution themselves intended to create an independent Poland, whose army would put 100,000 men on the Vistula in the service of France. Austria, as usual, followed on the tracks of Metternich and deceived and managed everybody, without contenting anybody, in the two-handed diplomatic game.

France, served by the jugglery of "Napoleon the Little," did despite to herself as she did despite to Poland. Great Britain played a deplorable game. Fearing a Franco-Russian alliance, she pushed on Napoleon to involve himself with Russia for the sake of Poland, and then left him alone to bear the consequences. Outwardly favourable to the cause of the Poles before a Europe which secretly sympathized with them, the British Government secretly tolerated another attitude in the dispatches of its representative on the banks of the Neva. "An independent Poland," complained Lord Napier, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, "would be a great Roman Catholic State, military and aggressive, hostile to Russia and Prussia and completely at the service of France. It would secure to France and to the Catholic Church a marked preponderance in Europe." Unconsciously led astray by Bismarck, the British Ambassador really helped Prussia in her crafty designs against Poland.

The overthrow of the insurrection of 1863 gave rise to protests, more misleading than ever, from the Western Powers. The conscience of the European peoples remained, this time, insensible to the disaster of Poland. The Kingdom of Poland which, since the revolution of 1830, had ceased to be a State, had now even ceased to bear its own name as a province. It became simply "the district of the Vistula" in accordance with a secret treaty drawn up after the Third Partition in 1797. The work of Napoleon and of the Congress of Vienna had been of no effect, except in so far as the latter had made certain territorial rearrangements. There was no longer any Polish problem, as a question of international law, for Poland herself had returned to the impotent conclusion of the Third Partition, and her affairs, now completely withdrawn from the cognizance of the West, were looked upon as no longer European, but simply as an internal concern of the three partitioning Powers. That was, at any rate, the official attitude adopted, not for the first time, a half-century ago. But history never completely returns on its former tracks. And even in this last period, the most reactionary of all for a Poland regulated by three great partitioning States,

the land question assumed an international interest and brought her condition more and more before the attention of Europe.

For the service rendered to Russia, to the detriment of Poland, Prussia was at first recompensed at the expense of Austria. Beaten by Prussia and betrayed by Russia, Austria gave autonomy to Galicia in 1867 and thus dissolved the copartnership between herself and her old accomplices. Prussia did not hesitate to avail herself of this fact to keep Russia quiet whilst she was hurling her armies on France. Prussia, in fact, was paid in valuable Austrian and French coin for what she had purchased very cheaply in Polish specie, and she did not hesitate to continue bargaining in this remunerative market. To render assured her European hegemony, she indemnified Russia by joining with her in the oppression of Poland. There was, in the first place, the "Kulturkampf" which synchronized with the Russian persecution of the Uniates. To hound on Russia to the denationalization of the "regions of the Vistula" Prussia showed the way in her ruthless Germanization of Posen. After her acrid conflict with Russia, however, on Eastern matters at the Congress of Berlin, Germany was obliged to enter on an alliance with Austria; but she took care, at the same time, to keep open—to use the very words of Prince Bismarck—the "telegraphic wire" with St. Petersburg, and that not so much by the so-called "reassuring" Convention of Skierniewice, as by the greater rigour of her operations against the Posen Poles. Prussia applied the same infallible method, after their difference on the subject of Bulgaria, with Alexander III, although she realized that this prince was breaking with the policy of his father and grandfather, which prescribed friendliness to his Western neighbour, and was leaning little by little in the direction of France.

After that date the authorities at Berlin found themselves obliged to contemplate the possibility of an attack, to protect their own interests, on both France and Russia. In the older days, Napoleon I, after he had crushed Prussia and Austria at Jena and Wagram, had felt himself constrained to enter on a decisive fight with Russia; and in

later times he never reproached himself for having taken this decision, but only for not carrying it out in the most efficient fashion. Bismarck, too, after his victories over Austria and France, at Sadowa and Sedan, thought the humiliation of Russia absolutely necessary; but he recoiled before a task which would involve such heavy sacrifices. The Iron Prince had not the Napoleonic mind; he was now too old and had already survived his best hours. He had no desire, in the evening of his days, to incur the terrible risks of a war with Russia. Above all, he did not desire the restoration of Poland, a consummation which would have been an inevitable consequence of the war. He much preferred to take a line of lesser resistance: to overthrow France a second time, and then, by inciting Austria to declare war against Russia, to enrich himself at the expense of whichever should be victor. It was in connection with this design that he recommended to Count Kalnoky, the Austrian Premier, the question of the Ukraine as one which could be exploited to the detriment of Russia. So it was that, after that date, Prussia made this Ruthenian question more acute chiefly to harass Poland, but at the same time to compromise Vienna with St. Petersburg much more certainly than could be done with the two-edged Polish weapon of offence. To help in this result, and in his own customary fashion, he offered the Polish Isaac as a propitiatory sacrifice to the enraged Russian overlord. In 1886 he carried his first rigorous colonization law, forbidding the use of the Polish language, professing at the same time that he did not believe in the efficacy of such a law, but that he had been driven to it by considerations of high policy. This excuse simply meant that he was using the persecution of the Poles as a means of commending himself to Russia. As the result showed, however, the stale and discredited policy achieved no more success in the external than in the internal politics of Prussia. It did not stop the Franco-Russian alliance, and it produced no better feeling between Russia and Prussia. On the contrary, it brought involuntary encouragement to a so-called "Polish-Russian rapprochement." The delivery of the new infant, so painful under the severe

regime of Alexander III, was facilitated when Bismarck made use of the unrelenting forceps of his anti-Polish policy.

At the beginning of the reign of William II, in face of the absolute impossibility of coming to an understanding with Alexander III, and owing to the revival of anti-Russian feeling at Berlin with the fall of Bismarck, the anti-Polish policy of the Iron Chancellor was modified for a short period by his successor, Count von Caprivi. It appeared again, however, with Prince Hohenlohe, the third Chancellor, after the accession of Nicholas II, because William II was able to resume with him, up to a certain point, the friendly relations of his ancestors. But Prince von Bülow, the fourth Chancellor, a pitiful caricature of the first, was only competent to surpass his predecessor in the excess of his militant "polonophobia." He chose a strange time for the execution of his designs. He projected severe measures against the Poles to make a diversion in favour of Russia at the time of her great internal troubles during the Russo-Japanese War. This led to a new and much more persistent effort after Polish-Russian conciliatory policy—that which has been called the "Pan-Slavist Movement."

Later, when Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was Chancellor, that statesman—at a time, too, when he was involved in critical questions of foreign policy like that of Morocco—set himself—as, it seemed, without provocation—to indulge in fresh and forcible measures of Polish coercion, expropriation laws, votes for expediting the colonization of Posen by Germans, etc. With him this kind of diversion became an obsession—even a mania and a superstition. To strike at the Poles—so it had often been found—was a sovereign specific for promoting goodwill and calming the nerves of Russia. Besides, this policy of luring on Austria to a Ukrainian anti-Polish agitation had the incidental result of lowering the prestige which that country had acquired by half a century of the results of Galician autonomy.

But all this was playing with two-edged tools. On the one hand there was no principle in such a policy. It

was only dictated by fear, and fitted to prejudice Austro-German relations either at that particular juncture or in a future more remote. It was, in fact, dictated by what the old Moltke once well described as the ancient panic fear of a Russian advance. The idea was to render Russia a service at the time of the Japanese war, and during the period of revolution and paralysis which succeeded it. Russia was then powerless to withstand a Prusso-Austrian invasion of the Kingdom of Poland and her western provinces, and what more timely reassurance could be given her than that she should see the policy of Thorough being carried out against the Poles of Posen, or the new votes of credit for German colonization, or the fresh prohibitory decrees against the Polish language, or the expropriation of Polish landowners; or, to turn our attention to the Austrian part of Poland, the Ukrainian campaign against the Poles of that province, the Agrarian agitation among the peasants of Ruthenia, the students' riots at the University of Lwow, or the assassination of Count Potocki, the Lieutenant-Governor of Galicia, by a Ruthenian fanatic? On the other hand, the idea was not simply to render Russia a service, but to get Prussia some gain as well. The screw was turned more tightly in the economic endeavour on the part of Germany to get a treaty of commerce from Russia; but to this there was superadded a political pressure put on the Russian Government to the detriment of Poland. During all this time, that is to say beginning from the era of so-called constitutional change in Russia, Berlin had one great object before it, to see that St. Petersburg granted no substantial concessions to the Poles, that, in fact, it kept in line with the anti-Polish policy of Prussia. Every such concession, in fact, wherever it was suggested, was immediately weakened by a counter suggestion from Berlin. Not that such weakening suggestions met with vehement opposition: in many ways they were only too welcome to a country whose bureaucratic and centralizing traditions only too strongly predisposed it in a similar direction.

To make a long story short, the Kingdom of Poland in the years before the war saw another creed taken under

official protection, and besides that, had to submit to the abolition of two-thirds of her parliamentary seats and to witness the separation of the district of Chelm and the taking over by the State of the Warsaw-Vienna railway. There can be no doubt that Germany looked on these events as ultimately subserving her interests. Poland would now have neither railways nor military force, and she would be obliged to remain perfectly quiescent. A country which in the days of the Tzar Alexander I had been powerful for offence was now rendered impotent even to defend her own frontiers. Besides, in thus increasing the chances of German immunity from invasion, a greater menace was held in store for Austria. Kieff and not Warsaw would be the essential base of future military operations, and the line of offence would no longer be in the direction of Posen but in that of Galicia and Lwow. Poland had thus been destined in advance to military occupation by the enemy in the event of a war, and in the conditions obtaining amongst the bureaucracy of Russia before the war these suggestions on the part of Germany were received without the smallest signs of repugnance.

Still, it remains true that all the most recent events in Poland before the war—even the Polish problem itself—had ceased to attract political interest among the Western Powers. In Great Britain people had lost sight of the former history of the country. They had quite forgotten even its present importance for Europe. Thomas Carlyle thanked Prussia for having accomplished the will of God in dismembering Poland. Lord Salisbury thanked Russia for having risen to the duties of a sober conservatism in suppressing the last Polish insurrection. The French Government of the Third Republic, through its ambassadors at St. Petersburg, showed no signs of movement in favour of the unhappy country. All this played into the hands of Prussia and left the coast clear for her political and military intrigues in Russia. Just before the European War broke out there were certain efforts to have the question reconsidered whether Poland should or not be sacrificed to military necessities in the event of actual

warlike operations. But before these questions could be adequately considered, the war came and put an end to further speculation.

III

Before the war, more than 80 per cent. of the superficial area of the ancient Poland and 75 per cent. of her total population found themselves under the dominion of Russia. To-day, after having lost 17 provinces, that is to say more than half of the superficial area, Russia retains still 40 per cent. of the area and 30 per cent. of the population of the old Republic. The principal point to be kept in mind relates to the distribution of the population. Out of 21 million Poles in Europe before the war, Russia ruled over 60 per cent., while Austria and Prussia, each of them, had not more than 20 per cent. To-day there hardly rests to Russia 10 per cent. of this total, while Prussia and Austria can now claim to have control over the lives of about 90 per cent. of the Poles properly so-called. This is a big change, though it may yet be followed by bigger changes in the opposite direction. However that may be, there can be no doubt that we are faced by the possibility of a new distribution of a large number of men and a huge amount of territory, the last remains of a renowned and ancient Republic.

In any case, this interchange of men and territory will not take place without exercising a decisive influence on the whole future of Europe. Poland, her claims once denied and forgotten by the European chancelleries, has become to-day the most living of realities. She is like the seed of the parable, which was sown by the Lord of the harvest; and the devil, who wanted to thwart the design of Heaven, succeeded in burying it in the earth, from which it soon emerged as the full corn in the ear. For the whole of Europe to-day, in spite of the noise of war, what will happen to Poland after the war is of the first importance. The former shortsighted indifference of the Western Powers, the blind fury of the partitioning States, have been shown to be absurd by the immanent logic of events. For France a fresh accession to the

German power by the annexation of Poland would be absolutely intolerable. For Great Britain a similar increase to any of the partitioning Powers would mean a serious disturbance to the balance of Europe. "If Russia," so declared Napoleon once at St. Helena in one of his prophetic moods, "succeeds in really assimilating Poland, not simply subjugating the country but in reconciling the inhabitants to her own Government, she will have made much progress on the road to India." Europe has made much progress since these words were uttered, and the questions which sadly troubled the minds of men a hundred years ago have no longer the same force and power to-day; but there can be no doubt, regarding the present situation, that Poland still remains the cockpit on which contending ambitions fight in defeat or victory.

Thus it is that, from these bloodstained battle-grounds, there has once more emerged that ancient Poland for whom her sons ask their still cherished possession of independence.

In earlier days, as already we have seen, each of the three partitioning Powers had secretly entertained the possibility of this consummation. They had even designed their respective candidates for the vacant throne. Prussia successively favoured the candidatures of Prince Henri after the First Partition, of the Prince Royal Louis after the Diet of Four Years, and of Prince Louis Ferdinand before Jena. Even the young Prince William, who afterwards became German Kaiser, was suspected by Russia of Polish dynastic ambitions when he paid court to the Princess Radziwill. Austria, after the partitions, supported first the candidatures of the Palatine Joseph, of the Archdukes Ferdinand and John, and especially that of the Archduke Charles. The latter, indeed, was renewed several times—during the insurrection of Kosciuszko, in the course of the Napoleonic Wars and after the November revolution. Even during the last January revolution it was still with Austria a question of elevating Ferdinand-Maximilian or Charles-Louis to the throne of Poland. The chief candidate of Russia, during and after the partitions, was the Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovitch—first immediately

after the fall of the Republic, then at Tilsit, and at certain times after the Congress of Vienna. Then, in the Napoleonic days, there were others who thought of the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, of the Duke of Oldenburg, and even of that Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna who had narrowly escaped becoming Queen of Poland. Lastly, at the time of the January insurrection, and with the assent of the Marquis Wielopolski, there was a very serious movement in favour of the Grand Duke Constantine Nicolaievitch. There were also British candidates, such as the Duke of York, the younger son of George III, before the Second Partition; there was not wanting even a great crop of French candidates—Bourbons, Orleanist, Bonapartist, Murat, Davout, Prince Jerome, the Duke of Reichstadt during the November revolution, and Prince Napoleon after that of January. The multiplication of these candidatures, though none of them succeeded, gave power to the sentiment diffused throughout Europe that Poland would one day rise from the ashes of her past.

For full fifty years before the war the sentiment no longer influenced the outward aspect of events, but deeper down it had never ceased to claim its power. To-day, when Europe has seen the great conflagration, it has again witnessed a speedy revival of the old-time Polish faith. In many different directions appeals are made for a free and independent Poland. Without doubt, some of these voices sound as hollow as those of the Congress of Vienna. They remind us of the subterfuges employed at the beginning of last century to convert perfectly possible schemes into considerable chimeras. But Europe will not repeat again these mistakes of the old regime, because in deceiving Poland, the ancient diplomatists heaped up disillusions for themselves. On the other hand, and on each side of the European battlefield, there are not lacking bitter protests against any design for the revival of Poland. Her inveterate enemies cry out against the reappearance of the White Eagle. Ah! well! such people have not taken the full measure of the problem they attempt to solve! It is not simply a problem of accustoming the eagles of the old partitioning States to

live along with the White Eagle, but of asking ourselves whether these others can in the future live together without the White Eagle between them.

The nationalists and conservatives of Germany are certainly not more realistic than Napoleon I, and the great conqueror was assuredly not more of a sentimentalist than they when he made up his mind to recreate Poland. A war like that which is raging to-day is not a paying speculation: it is a mortal disease. The sick man, grievously wounded, does not ask what he is going to gain, but whether he may hope to recover? A complete and lasting cure for the troubles of Europe is the greatest result which the civilized peoples may gain from the war. But such a result can be gained on only one condition, and that is that Europe shall be cured of the grievous wounds that have been opened up by the vivisection of Poland. And it is only the establishment of a Poland, free and independent, that can again make Europe healthy and whole.

EDUCATION IN POLAND DURING THE GREAT WAR

By Rev. J. Gralewski

[Rev. Jan Gralewski, the author of the following article, is a man known and beloved throughout all the kingdom of Poland and especially in Warsaw. He was member for Warsaw in the second Duma, but soon gave up politics and devoted himself to educational reform. He travelled through Europe and America, and as a result of what he saw he founded the first secondary school of a modern type in Poland at Stara Wies, near Warsaw. Since the war began he has been prominent in Warsaw as a member of the educational section of the Central Citizens' Committee; and in a report on education which he drew up for that body he declared that "only a free nation can give free education." In his view the national school "ought to work for the removal from the national system of all mischievous influences and defects which have infected the education of Polish children owing to their lack of freedom. It should also promote the spread of truth and daily uprightness, and inculcate personal and public responsibility."]

Until the year 1905, Polish could only be used in Poland within the family circle, or at church or in the theatre or by journalists and authors under the strict control of the Russian censor. The whole of the educational system—public or private, from the elementary school to the university—had been completely Russianized. Teaching also was given in Russian, with the temporary exception of religious instruction. The Polish language was an optional subject, and when lectures were given on the native tongue they had to be delivered outside the ordinary time-table. The teachers had to talk Russian to their students, as well as make it the public medium for imparting knowledge. Polish talk was absolutely forbidden

within the school bounds, and every violation of this rule was severely punished.

In 1905, however, there was a boycott of these Russianized schools by parents and children, and this compelled the Government to make some concessions in the way of granting a further measure of liberty to the private schools.

Permission was at the same time given for optional religious teaching, in Polish, of the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, and for Polish teaching of the Polish language in Lithuania and Ruthenia[1]—in which ancient provinces of the Polish Republic such teaching had up till that time either been carried on in Russian or else strictly prohibited.

No sooner had the Imperial rescript authorizing this reform been published than 12,000 Polish children—boys and girls—set themselves to study Polish in the Russian secondary schools. The private schools which, but one day before, had witnessed their teaching wholly given in Russian, were now, within the compass of twenty-four hours and simply by the mysterious vitality of the Polish national spirit, transformed at once into national Polish establishments! Pupils left the schools of the State, and it was the private establishments which became the objects of a people's hopes. Voluntary workers tendered their help. Fittings and furniture were at once forthcoming. Educational and civic associations, which thus stepped into the breach, revealed with surprising power the creative energy of the nation in the domain of education. The "Macierz Polska," or the "Polish Society for the Foundation of Schools for the People," under the leadership of its devoted president Osuchawski, summoned as if by the stroke of a magician's wand some thousands of elementary schools, of libraries, of continuation classes, of lecture courses, of classes for the unlettered to rise in the sight of men.

But this state of things was only allowed to last for two years. Scarcely had twenty-four months elapsed when the hand of the Government, dismayed by the spectacle

[1] Ruthenia includes not only the eastern part of Galicia, but Podolia, Volhynia, Ukraina, etc.

of popular enlightenment, was heavily laid on these high-souled endeavourers. The Russian Government suppressed the "Macierz Polska" as an outward organization, but it could never succeed in eradicating from the minds of its founders the idea of popular instruction. The secret popular schools became less numerous, but the thought embodied in them still survived. These organizers of the people were opposed to all attempts at Russification; they hated those who struggled against the light, and they were absolutely determined to prepare the coming generation for a life and death struggle against all oppressors and their systems of oppression.

The secondary private school, rescued from ruin, multiplied the scope of its activities. Restrictions of all kinds were placed upon its work, and yet its teachers continued to perfect their educational syllabus, at once improving the organization of the schools and the character of the teaching.

But the University of Warsaw, being still Russian, was boycotted by the young men, who would otherwise have availed themselves of its teachers.

Then came the war, and the Polish people soon perceived that their native land was about to become the cockpit of a great European conflict. Sanguinary battles were fought on the devastated territory, but all these cries and shouts of war did not prevent the Poles from thinking first of the future of their children.

Associations of educational experts were formed to consider preliminaries. Committees were nominated, public meetings were held, and all the deliberations were directed to one aim and object—the organization, in the future free Poland, of public schools for all the people.

After the first year of war, the Russian Government granted to the private Polish schools some slight concessions. For example, it recognized their leaving certificates as qualifying for an army commission—a measure which was, indeed, rendered necessary by the serious lack of officers in the Russian forces. Then, again, an examination could now be held in the private schools, in presence of Russian inspectors, to determine how far the pupils were

proficient in their general Polish instruction. The inspectors behaved quite irreproachably at the examinations, and the result was that they declared themselves thoroughly satisfied as to the character of the instruction.

But on the fateful day of 5th August 1915 there were in Warsaw neither Russian officials nor a Russian army! The Poles, for two hours, were monarchs of all they surveyed. Inspired by a deep love of national education, combined with an innate talent for administration, they succeeded in the course of these two hours in founding a Ministry of Education, with its different departments; though they were content to call it simply "The Educational Section of the Municipal Committee of the City of Warsaw." All the municipal reformers and technical experts—the men who had organized the secret schools before the war and who had become inured to difficulty through their contest with the Russian authorities—all these men rallied to the work. The schools acknowledged this authority which had been improvised so hastily. Before even the new invaders had grasped the situation, a fresh educational power, acknowledged by the whole people, had been solidly established.

The Russians had left in Warsaw only 125 elementary school teachers; but in the month of September, when the new authority reopened the schools, that number had been increased to 700. The Russian language was no longer used in the junior schools, as it simply impeded the course of elementary instruction; but in the secondary schools, where they pursued the study of other languages, Russian was allowed to be taken as an optional subject.

It was still necessary to organize schools for teachers in order to make the new syllabus effective. Up to that time, teachers were unable, except secretly, to improve their knowledge of Polish history, literature, and geography, as the Russians were unwilling to allow any of these subjects. Having to choose between classes on the general theory of pedagogics—equally neglected by the Russians—and instruction on these national subjects, the educational authority decided to give preference to the latter, and to trust to the educational instincts

of their masters for the pedagogic soundness of their teaching.[1]

For the first time in fifty years, the walls of the schools freely echoed the Polish language. Young girls of eighteen and old men of sixty combined to fill the benches in the great halls of the buildings. A spirit of religious earnestness pervaded the lecture-halls. Now the Poles were able openly to study their national history, to understand their much loved country, and to add to the creative power of the national thought in the domain of culture. The Germans did not so much fear this advance of Polish culture as they did the organizing activity of the Poles—an activity which could paralyse even the spirit of Prussianism.

Creches were founded and instruction was given to those who were to take charge of them. Adult schools reduced the number of illiterates whom the Russians had left throughout the country. The working men's colleges attracted numerous artizans, who, reduced to penury by the destruction of factories in the Russian retreat and living on the funds allotted by the municipality, had nevertheless still cherished their intellectual aspirations. Such men as these eagerly followed the lectures which told them of the country that ever suffered, worked, and fought, but which ever cherished the hope of one day recovering its liberty and political independence. Nor were the children left without guidance in their hours of play. All the newest educational methods were followed in this remarkable triumph of improvised organization. Technical schools made the artizans, mechanics, and agriculturists of the future. The masters of secondary schools, ill paid as they were, perfected their education by founding voluntary associations, where they met and studied together.

The German authorities approved these plans, only making this stipulation, that while they would be responsible for the upkeep of the University and the Polytechnic, the national organizations or the municipality should be

[1] The author of this article had himself the privilege of starting these new schools.

responsible for the Commercial and Agricultural Schools. The Polish department could nominate professors, but the German authorities reserved to themselves the definitive appointment. Of course the Poles would have preferred to be independent of the Germans altogether, but they were obliged to accept a German grant before they could open the University and Polytechnic, which soon reckoned 2,000 students in their lecture-rooms. The "intellectuals" of the land had hitherto been unable to do any public teaching, but now they occupied chairs in the new teaching establishments and exercised a living influence on the rising generation. The Germans brought experts on education from different parts of Middle Europe to help them; they used the Polish University to create in their favour a good political impression. The Poles, however, thought of it only as an educational workshop; they took no account of the presence of the Germans, just as in the past they had taken no account of the Russians. The younger generation worked with a will, for they had learnt the love of education in the Polish private schools; they stuck to their work with such steady persistence that the results compared very favourably with those obtained under the Russian administration. The lecture-rooms were so full that many students found themselves excluded from the hall, and the professors had to repeat their lectures in order that those left out in the cold should have the opportunity of benefiting by their instructions.

The educational budget of the city of Warsaw alone reached the sum of £180,000. To this must be added the private subscriptions to pay the fees of poor students and to feed necessitous children, which added to the previous total another £50,000. Before the war, no more than £60,000 was spent on exactly the same objects. In spite of the famine that had already crushed the energies of a part of the population, Warsaw did not hesitate one moment to devote a very appreciable sum to this work of education. All the more so that it was the first time for fifty years that it had been possible to give public instruction in Polish.

Considerable enthusiasm was exhibited by all classes

of society in order to create a Polish educational organization in Lithuania and in Ruthenia. Wilna already boasted of nearly forty Polish schools, but there was now a question of reopening the ancient University. At Bialystok there are also found two secondary schools and several elementary schools. Many Polish schools were also founded at Kobryn, Luck, and in all the government of Chelm.

All ranks and classes of the populace contributed as they could to the funds for national education, and the organizing genius of the Poles revealed itself once again in the great work of education.

So far from opposing the educational movement, the German authorities lent it their support. On the other hand, when it came to the question of the control of the schools, they did their utmost to reduce the rôle of the Polish committees simply to the care of equipment and fittings. The Poles did not, however, take this lying down. They presented a memorandum to the German authorities in which they showed by weighty arguments that they had a right to direct the schools, so long as an ultimate veto rested with the German authorities.

Long years of vigorous protests against oppression had inured the Poles to resistance, and it was with resolute spirit that they entered on a conflict with the *de facto* government on the question of education. They did not recoil from the heaviest sacrifices, and they made up their minds, if the need arose, to have recourse to a boycott of the schools.

With that idea in their minds, they refused the proposal which was made to them to allow a few hours of teaching in German every week in the elementary schools; and having already organized a Polish inspectorate, they were not reduced to the necessity of accepting either the German educational syllabus or the German Polish-speaking inspectors which it was attempted to force on them. Supported by a section of the Jewish population, they also protested against the German attempt to impose on the Jews the German elementary school. They even refused to recognize the teacher's continuation classes

which the Germans had started, notwithstanding the fact that the teaching there was to be given in Polish and by Polish instructors.

To all this the German authorities retorted by taking away from the Polish Sub-Committee its powers in all that concerned the internal organization of the schools, leaving to it only a responsibility so far as concerning furniture and fittings. But whenever it received the news of this decision the Polish Educational Department passed the following resolution: "In view of the fact that the communication of the Prefecture of Police embodies a series of decisions which cut at the base of all the work done by the Poles during six months in order to satisfy the intellectual needs of the Polish people, this Educational Department considers that it has been *ipso facto* dissolved by the German authorities. If it is still nominally recognized by the occupying officials, it will be more convenient that this should cease, (1) because otherwise the nation will be led astray when it imagines it can require from the Polish Sub-Committee the execution of the duties which have been entrusted to it; (2) because then it will not prevent other social service bodies from charging themselves with a work of the very highest importance which the present Sub-Committee is no longer in a position to undertake."

If necessity compelled it, the Polish people would be ready to return to those old clandestine methods of teaching which they practised during many years of Russian oppression, always awaiting the day when Poland shall be delivered and there shall be a Polish Minister of Public Education in a free and independent State.

POLITICAL LIFE IN POLAND

BEING A LECTURE DELIVERED IN PARIS AT THE "ECOLE DES HAUTES ETUDES SOCIALES"

By Stanislaw Posner

There is a well-known saying of Seneca, "The wise man understands causes and not the phantasies of fate." That is why, in speaking of the political life of Poland, I confine myself all the time to accredited history. This political life of Poland, divided up among three different States, having each of them its distinctive political life, its different political constitution, its divers manners and cast of mind, has created a number of problems, situations, and difficulties of such intricate complexity that the Poles themselves often miss their way among them "in wandering mazes lost." What attention, then, do they not demand from strangers, however favourably predisposed to the Polish cause?

Within this vast complexus of events embracing the political life of a people of twenty million souls, I shall select some distinctive problems in order to deal with them in a slightly more detailed fashion. Before our eyes, at all these parts of the arena of politics, the tragedy of the nation will unveil itself.

Compelled to fling themselves into the combat, the Polish people have endured and will still endure. Adversity has only doubled the measure of their endurance. They are like Antæus, who, when he had reached his mother earth, sprang up again stronger than ever. Their enemies have evicted them from their estates, but they still maintain themselves within their ancient boundaries.

They have become thrifty and far-seeing; not having sufficient money to contend against an antagonist so strong as the State of Bismarck and William II, they have set sail for the New World. They have spread themselves over both hemispheres, only to send back from their new lands sufficient money to render their own kith and kin better equipped by the acquisition of the technical methods of their oppressors.

Their enemies have declared war against their language and their faith. But they still remain faithful to the Church of their fathers, and never a day passes but they murmur prayers in the language which the Polish mother croons in the nursery over her little child. They learn to read and think accurately in this national tongue. They become citizens in the untranslatable sense of the Polish word "*obywatel*," a word which sums up the affection, the duty, the love that is ready to endure every hardship, of citizens of the Polish Commonwealth.

How many of these citizens were there when the Polish ship of State foundered on the rocks? A mere handful, a few thousands! In their hour of supreme anguish the patriots of that day—Kollontay, Potocki, Kosciuszko—vowed to keep together. They cried out, "*Never give in.*" After a hundred years of endeavour the Polish people, a people abreast of the age like other Western nations, can reply to this impassioned call, "*We never will give in.*"

You know the problems I want to consider with you. Many times in the reviews and in the papers of specialists friendly writers have put them forcibly before you. I can plunge at once *in medias res*, to tell you how the Polish peasant saves his land in Posen, how he administers a State in Galicia, and how he succeeds in retaining his Polish education in Russian Poland.

On the 25th May 1815 Frederick William III addressed the following appeal to the people of the Grand Duchy of Posen:—

> You have become part of the monarchy and you are under no obligation to forswear your nationality. You will receive a

provincial constitution. Your religion will be respected. Your personal liberties and your property will be placed under the protection of the law. You will be able to speak your native language on all public occasions as freely as you make use of German. Public offices in the Grand Duchy will be open to every Pole of the requisite ability.

The history of Prussian Poland during the whole century since that date is the most convincing evidence of the fashion in which these promises have been fulfilled.

The Prussians began by giving to the country a former lieutenant of the Polish king, Prince Radziwill. Then came Flotwell on the scene with a complete scheme of Germanization. He even founded churches to popularize the use of the German language, and he bought Polish estates in order to sell them again to Germans.

In 1848, under the influence of the French Revolution of that year, there broke out in Posen a great movement of protest. The Poles asked only for the fulfilment of the promises of 1815. Their demands were drowned in blood.

It was then that there was revealed the implacable wrath of the Iron Chancellor. In the month of March 1848 the King received with uncovered head a Polish deputation of political prisoners liberated by the people of Berlin, and promised to see that the question of the reorganization of Posen received attention from his advisers. In the opinion of Bismarck, who was then an unknown hobereau of Pomerania, the politics of the King were marked by the most regrettable quixotism that a State had ever manifested for its own ruin. In his *Recollections* may be read the words: "The necessity of beginning to fight with the Roman Catholic Church—the *Kulturkampf* —was imposed on me from a consideration of the problem of Poland." The surest way of Germanizing Poland, so the Prussians calculated, was to forbid in her schools the use of that mother-tongue by which her spirit was manifested and preserved. He who wins the schools wins the youth, and he who wins the youth is master of the future.

The introduction of German teachers into the Polish schools of Posen was a blow against Rome, but it was also a blow against Poland. In 1873 it was decided that German only should be spoken in the schools—with this exception, that religious instruction need only be given in that tongue to pupils who were sufficiently advanced to speak German freely. Yet once the principle was admitted, it received an interpretation which practically made the use of German obligatory in religious instruction. The child was compelled to pray in German. The child protested. The parents joined in the protest. The famous Polish novelist, M. Ladislas Reymont, has depicted the sorrows of Polish children in a Prussian school.

The teacher at the opening of the school desires to compel his pupils to say their prayers in German. Ten times he repeats the words "Our Father, which art in heaven," and ten times not the faintest echo of a child's voice reverberates through the room. After a while the big Prussian gets exasperated at an obstinacy which yields neither to his direct menace nor to the remembrance of his punishment of the day before. Once again he prepares to punish the young rebels. He is red with rage and boiling over with wrath.

The children, however, are in no way intimidated. They answer boldly when their names are called, with an exultation that becomes almost joyous, murmuring under their breath in Polish that Lord's Prayer which they had refused to repeat in the tongue of the enemy. Finally the teacher, overcome by his pupils' heroism and his own wrath, bids them return to their places and remain seated.

Panting with fatigue, he sinks back again on his seat and angrily he scans the stubborn faces of the children. Some still show marks of the punishment which they have received. But before he has quite recovered, a child of seven or eight years on one of the farther benches, a little girl with rosy lips and eyes blue as the dome of heaven, steps up to the master with timorous gravity, puts out first one and then the other of her little hands, and murmurs faintly, almost with a sob, "Please, sir, you haven't beaten me yet."

Here is the description of a French writer, Dr. Nicaise:

> In Posen can be seen children weeping and crying, beaten and bruised by their German teachers. The mothers are full of sorrow when their dear ones come home from school marked by the cane and covered with blood. The children protested against the German teaching. They ceased to attend the schools. The State cherished the design of bringing them back again by force. They were kicked and pinched. Their masters applied the whip, the cane, and the stick. They tried to overcome resistance by all these compulsory methods. To these even others were added. The children were sent to reformatories. The students were restricted or forbidden the advantages of special courses of training.

But all these methods were of no avail. Dr. Mearse tells us how in one village the son of a poor gardener, having received from his teacher forty strokes of the cane, was so badly wounded and bruised that he could hardly creep home. That very same evening the village squire, seeing a light in a grange which belonged to him, and fearing danger from fire, went out in the dusk to see what was the matter. Arriving at the door he heard the voices of children, and on entering he recognized some little ones of the village who were singing the historic songs of their own Polish lands. Amongst them the gardener's little son, who had been so badly treated that he could not sit, was leaning against the wall and leading the singing. "When," asks the French writer who gives the description, "will the men who govern a country comprehend that you can do nothing against the power of the Idea?"

Article 12 of the Law of Associations is the last of this series of attempts to suppress the Polish language. Wherever in any district, so this law enacts, the Germans form more than 40 per cent. of the whole population, all the proceedings in any public gathering must be conducted in German. Even when such public gatherings were held in the capital city of Posen itself, it was henceforth criminal to use the Polish tongue.

This educational conflict was the means of stimulating

and organizing the great mass of the peasants who had hitherto been careless of their material interests. The State accordingly attacked them on this side as well.

To keep well under control the national sentiment of Germany and Prussia, it was necessary for Bismarck and his successors to be able to point out some permanent national peril to the Fatherland. Alsatians, Danes, and Poles, they must all be frightened into submission. On one occasion the Government compelled all the Poles who were not Prussian subjects—both Prussians and Austrians —to leave certain lands immediately. Several thousands of Poles, including families established for many years in Posen, were compelled to give up their ancient homes. At another time a high official, called Von Tiedemann, addressed a report to Bismarck, in which he contended that the Prussian Government might profit from the deplorable condition of Polish landed estates. He asked 10,000,000 marks for the purchase of properties. "The State," wrote he, "can divide up these lands and settle German smallholders on them, and thus ensure a decided preponderance of German elements in the population."

The State gave him 100,000,000 marks in order, so Bismarck wrote, to prevent the German element from being driven back out of Posen. His agents bought land suitable for small holdings. They organized settlements. They built schools and churches and arranged some elementary agricultural instruction in the German tongue. Such a law was evidently meant to take away all big estates from the control of the Poles, the reason being that Bismarck was of opinion that the big Polish landowners were at the head of the National movement. If only these big estates could be split up the people of Posen might be completely Germanized. In twenty years 385,000 hectares were bought and a Protestant German population of 100,000 was established on 12,000 small holdings.

How did the Polish people meet this bitter provocation? In a manner worthy of the very highest praise. They established a perfect network of societies, social, economic, financial, and political. Some united the small proprietors.

Others grouped their resources through the agency of a central committee or of a people's bank. Their activities were diverse, but their action and their aims were one. Dr. Marcinkowski founded a society, thanks to which 10,000 destitute people were able to qualify as doctors, engineers, and architects. Jackowski, an old veteran of 1863, dedicated himself entirely to the cause of the peasants and became an untiring organizer of co-operative establishments. In 1873 there were only eleven peasant societies in Posen. In 1886 there were 120. In 1905 their number had risen to 300.

Every spring these various societies had a congress. To this congress each sent the president and another additional delegate; and it was summoned during the same week in which the big landed proprietors held their annual meeting. So it came about that at this particular time Posen saw a demonstration of several thousand men pass along its streets—a result of his policy which Bismarck certainly did not anticipate. The different industries of Posen had likewise their particular unions. These felt it their duty to boycott German goods and to make it impossible for the Jews to continue the sole and necessary middlemen. Twenty thousand Polish workmen migrated and invaded the industrial establishments of the Rhenish Provinces and Westphalia to gather the price of a little plot of ground. They lived apart and mingled in no way with the German population. In Silesia a population of about a million proclaimed themselves Polish.

The financial organization gave particular power to this movement of association. The unions were federated and represented on a central committee by seven delegates. These proceeded to elect a chairman, who was the real Finance Minister of the Duchy of Posen. For twenty years a distinguished clergyman, the Rev. Wawzyniak (1849–1910), the son of a peasant, exercised this important influence. To the attacks of the Prussian Government he only replied: "Far from us are all thoughts of revenge, for revenge is only a pagan vice." His perfect tact and rare cleverness made him victorious over every kind of

difficulty. Credit banks, co-operative societies for buying and selling, and smallholders' societies covered the face of the country. There was a network of banks, one hundred of them small, twenty intermediate, and seven big banks, with one great central bank which supplied the capital necessary for their continuance. After twenty years the capital of this central bank was raised to three millions, and the deposits rose from fifteen to one hundred and seven millions.

The big landed proprietors had also their Agricultural Union. They were harassed by the Government, and they established banks and societies to regulate the breaking up of the land. The Government Commission had indeed set about its work methodically. It bought lands in such a position as to hem in the little towns which were the strongholds of Polish nationalism. But then it received a check. After 1898 there were no more Polish lands on the market. The only offers to sell came from German proprietors.

The cause was not far to seek. The speculators of the Commission had inflated the price of land. A hectare was worth, in 1886, 586 marks; in 1901, 801 marks; and in 1912, 1,400 marks.

The German then forced his land on the Commission by threatening, if they refused it, to sell it to the Poles. In 1907 Prince von Bülow deplored in the Prussian Diet the sad lack of patriotism shown by his fellow-countrymen in the Duchy of Posen. During twenty years, out of a total of 385,000 hectares bought by the Colonization Commission, no less than 274,546 hectares were sold by Germans and only 110,714 by Poles.

This primitive plan had, in fact, failed, and other more forcible methods were accordingly attempted. In 1908 the Poles were forbidden to build upon the land of which they became possessors. Then the Government proceeded to another extreme measure—the Law of Expropriation. The Union of the Eastern Marshes (founded by three landed proprietors: Hannemann, Kenneman, and Tiedemann, who were also financiers) comprised 429 branches and a total membership of 50,000, and it always manifested

very great activity. It loudly called on the Government to elaborate a law of expropriation. "We shall only be the masters," declared Tiedemann, with massive simplicity, "when we become the owners of the soil."

Prince Bülow, then Chancellor, spoke as follows:—

> Do not let us make any mistake. The question is whether our eastern frontier shall be German or Polish. The Polish agitators have formed a State within a State. Can we consent to lose two provinces, of which one lies not far off from Berlin? We cannot, and that is why we are obliged to expropriate the Poles. It is simply a measure of legitimate self-defence. . . Our proposals are not really contrary to the constitution. According to Article 4 all the citizens of Prussia are equal before the law, but the Poles are rebels in the eyes of the law. . . . Article 9 lays down that the State must protect property, but how can it protect property if it cannot protect itself?

The Law of Expropriation was passed in February 1908. It was applied for the first time in the month of March 1913. In 1913 the Diet voted 230 millions extra money for expenses incidental to its application.

Politics in Galicia

The Empress Maria Theresa and the Emperor Joseph II established in Galicia a regime of Germanization and of colonization. They established in the country 3,000 German and Protestant families. The idea underlying the methods of the Vienna bureaucracy was *divide et impera*. Isolate as far as possible the different social classes. The officials were German or Czech. German was the language used in administration, the schools, the courts of law, and the University of Lwow. The Diet of Lwow met only when the Austrian Government wanted funds or desired fresh recruits for the Army, and when it did meet, its discussions did not last longer than a single day.

Life was sad and mournful. Free speech rendered a citizen liable to prosecution. Any one a little different from the ordinary became a marked man. Yet there was

no lack of patriots who consented thus to be marked. And what was most remarkable of all, there were amongst them some Austrians, the sons of the enemy, who had been assimilated by that power which the Poles have always had of infecting with their own spirit the most alien elements. The poet Wincenty Pol, son of a German official, the great national historian Szaynocha, the son of a Tchèque official, Count Fredro, and several others likeminded had also experience of the "sweet consolation" of an Austrian prison. In 1843 there was discovered a secret organization, of which Smolka and Ziemialkowski were the chiefs. Both were condemned to death and then pardoned. The one later on became . . . Life President of the Parliament of Vienna, the other Austrian Minister for Galicia.

"Most nations," once said a French thinker, "have entered the land of political freedom through the narrow gate of defeat. They have sought compensation in internal reform for their failure in the hour of battle. They have tried to make liberty avenge misfortune. That was at any rate the case with Austria. It was only in the hard school of adversity, after having lost her Italian provinces and having submitted to defeat in the war with Prussia in 1866, that the monarchy of the Habsburgs learned to appreciate the political value of equity and moderation and respect for the spirit of nationality. Especially after Sadowa Austria understood that only by trusting to her people could she escape a final catastrophe: and it was further brought home to her that she could only obtain that trust if she showed respect for their natural rights.

In 1866 a Pole was appointed the Emperor's lieutenant in Galicia. Teaching was given in Polish. The same language, along with Ruthenian, was used in the Courts of Law. Lwow received many Ruthenian chairs and the whole teaching was dominated by the Poles. In 1873 there was founded at Cracow an Academy of Sciences and of Letters. Other societies were soon established, scientific, literary, and philosophical. An Academy of Fine Arts owes its inception to the admirable work of Jan Mateyko. The Exhibition held at Lwow in 1894

was held to commemorate the insurrection of Kosciuszko, and it was at the same time a notable Polish demonstration —the solemn act of a people affirming its indestructible vitality in the face of the whole world. At the same time the exhibition was a proof of the benefits and the progress which Galicia had achieved as the result of her reconquered liberty. Her land and economic resources had been exploited. Her educational activities had increased. In twenty-five years she had seen 6,000 kilometres of new roads and 2,500 kilometres of railways. The number of elementary schools had increased by 1,450. The number of pupils in the secondary schools mounted from 8,000 to 14,000.

In 1908–9, according to the official record of the National Council of Education, Galicia possessed 105 secondary schools with 41,548 pupils. She also possessed 7 industrial schools. Galicia possessed in 1912, 53 savings banks with a reserve capital of 16 million francs, and deposit funds amounting to 336 million crowns. In the schools as well special savings banks were organized by the teachers. In 1873 there were sixteen Schulze-Delizsch Societies of mutual credit; whereas in 1912 this number had risen to 238 with 350,000 members, 130 million crowns of deposits. Reiffeisen banks were founded in 1912 to the number of 1,334. Connected with them were 27 dairymen's societies and 8 organizations for selling peat, 330,000 members were on the books of the banks and they dispensed funds amounting to 3 millions. At the time the Union of Co-operative Societies counted 334 branches, 362,368 members, and dispensed a capital of 53 million crowns.

For a long time Galicia was governed by the Conservative Party, which chiefly represented the big landed proprietors. They had gained this commanding influence because of their loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty. They had other advantages as well. Since 1867 there have been about twenty Polish Ministers at Vienna, and in the Foreign Office at one particular time there were about fifty Polish officials.

Bismarck said on one occasion, in a contemptuous tone,

"Poland only consists of nobles and clergy." He would not presume—even this man who could presume more than most—to repeat such a sentiment nowadays. Rather he would now be obliged to agree with a recent utterance of a Prussian investigator, Professor Bernhardt of Berlin, who called the Prussian provinces "the peasant republic of Posen."

Nor could Bismarck's taunt be made applicable to the Galicia of to-day. Since the electoral reforms of 1907, one has only to attend a meeting of the Polish Parliamentary Club at Vienna to say, with only the slightest spice of exaggeration, "Poland is everything except only nobles and clergy." It is true that when the class system was the rule in Austria, a deputy of the first class (the big proprietors) represented 110 electors at Vienna, a deputy of the second class (the Chamber of Commerce) 30 electors, a town deputy 3,139 electors, a country deputy 20,000 electors, and a deputy elected by universal suffrage 86,000 electors.

But from the time when the people began to realize their rights, they never ceased to demand universal suffrage. The struggle went on for about twenty years, and developed by successive stages of piecemeal reform to the sweeping suffrage enactment of 1907. At the same time, however, the Ruthenian problem became more intricate and pressing. Adroit agents took it under their charge, and revived with all the energy they had at their command the old maxim of Metternich, "*Divide et impera.*" In the hands of these triflers the question proved very suitable to envenom for some time the political life of the country. Foreign observers felt that the atmosphere was surcharged with electricity. In 386 communes of Ruthenia agricultural strikes suddenly broke out in 1902, and led in some cases even to sanguinary reprisals. In the South of France and in Italy there were similar strikes that same year, but those in Galicia had a political aspect as well. The Swedish writer Björnson, who knew little of Poland and had certainly never visited Galicia, published on this subject a letter in German which had a very wide circulation. Education only made

deeper the lines of cleavage. Out of 2,739 elementary Polish schools there were, in 1908–9, no less than 269 which were Ruthenian. The Ruthenians besides have five secondary schools and several professional chairs at the University of Lwow. Electoral reform became every day more urgent. It was just about to be carried into practice when the war broke out.

Politics in Russian Poland

Let us now, however, turn our thoughts to Russian Poland. Sad were the years that followed 1863. In Lithuania, Mouravyeff made a special levy on all the Polish landowners. Later on the levy was made a permanent tax (10 per cent. on income) and was called the tax payable by the Polish proprietors. Poles were forbidden to acquire any fresh property by way of purchase. No Pole could hold any important public office. They could not even be employed as clerks in the Agricultural Bank of Kieff. In 1894, the Minister of Communications traced a line of demarcation from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea by Petersburg, Pskow, Dynaburg, Smolensk, and the Dnieper. To the west of this line the rule was that no Catholic could be employed! The Polish tongue was forbidden in Courts of Law. At Wilno it was not allowed in public meetings, in churches, public places, or public entertainments, in restaurants or in shops. Teachers could not employ it, chemists dared not use it in their prescriptions. Merchants could not speak in it when addressing their customers or their clerks. Polish books must not be conspicuous on the shelves of public libraries.

Catholic churches were turned into shrines of the Orthodox faith. New churches could not be built, and old ones must not be restored. The bell could not be rung. The Host could not be carried in procession. Priests could not distribute medals or crosses. The efforts to introduce the Russian language into the Catholic churches were multiplied. The Government of Wilno proposed in 1885 to limit by 20 or 30 per cent. the number

of Polish nobles who might gain access to the Catholic seminaries. The inspectors who presided at the examinations of the candidates were instructed to refuse all those who had distinguished themselves by their intelligence and grasp. "It is not in the interest of the Russian Government," wrote the Minister of the Interior, "to help in raising the level of the Catholic priests. The more they are raised in intelligence, the more they will be qualified to contend successfully against the priests of the Orthodox faith." "Pray explain to Mgr. Hryniewiecki," wrote the same Minister in 1884 to the Governor-General of Wilno, "that it is not the Government, as he imagines, that must give way to the behests of a foreign faith, which, like that of the Romish Church, is only tolerated in the Russian Empire. Quite the contrary. It is the teachings of the faith that must adapt themselves to the exigencies of our laws, since their only justification is their conformity to our enactments."

One evening in the month of November 1894 an anxious crowd flocked into the church of Kroze (government of Kovno). The story had been noised abroad that its closing was contemplated, and the people hurried there to prevent this. While they were singing a band of Cossacks burst into the sacred building, and pitilessly struck every unfortunate person who happened to stand in their way. They treated with contumely the crosses and the images of the saints. They eventually carried out of the bloodstained temple the wounded and the dead. The women and children were left untouched in the church, but the next day they were flogged by order of General Klingenberg, the Governor of Kovno.

After the Church, the school. In 1868 the Polish language was removed from the curricula of the secondary schools and from higher education generally. The University of Warsaw was employed as an instrument of denationalization. Russian was henceforth to be the sole language of education in primary schools. M. Witte, the Director of Education in the kingdom, who sought with intense zeal the denationalization of Poland, made the following significant statement on his arrival at Warsaw:

"In three years you will hear the Polish mothers speaking Russian to their children." He forced the Catholic clergy from the schools and put in their place teachers of the Orthodox faith. Yet the Polish mothers have never ceased to speak Polish to their children.

In fact, the politics of implacable hate only produced one result: the schools were forsaken by the Polish population. That did not mean, however, that there were no means of spreading education among the peasants and the workmen. But it engendered a hatred of Russia which, as was written fifteen years ago by the French Professor Ch. Dupuis, is "the blended result of all those evil persecutions inflicted on the very people, amongst whom, thirty years ago, the bureaucrats of Petersburg had dreamed of finding their support."

The predictions of M. Witte have not been realized, and his successor, the famous M. Apouchtine, announced, in taking up his office, that in ten years the Polish nurses would rock their infants to sleep with Russian lullabies. Polish was again strictly forbidden at the schools. Inspectors paraded the corridors, in silent shoes, to take unawares any child that might speak Polish after the lesson or in the playground. The French historian, M. Denis, remarks in his valuable work on Bohemia that, though it is perhaps a misfortune to be born a Pole, it has not yet become a crime. M. Apouchtine did not share this opinion of the eminent French historian. To him it was a crime to speak Polish, a crime to read a Polish book, a crime even to collect a few friends at your private residence. Police officers made domiciliary visits, and showed great satisfaction when they laid hold of a small volume of Polish history or literature, a volume of Mickiewicz or of Slowacki. Young people who were guilty of the crime of harbouring books like these were visited with most serious penalties.

In the rural elementary schools books printed in Russian characters were used for teaching the Catechism. The peasant had no wish to frequent such a school. "What good does it do me?" he asked. "At the end of three years I cannot read my service book which is written in Polish."

What have been the final results of this educational policy? The number of illiterates was 75 per cent. in the country and 60 per cent. in Warsaw. Governor Podgorodnikoff said, in an official report of 1904, that nobody could expect efficient work from an elementary school since the Catholic religion was taught there by teachers of the Greek Church, who had no practical acquaintance with its tenets. In another official report of Prince Imeretynski, addressed to the Emperor Nicholas II in January 1898, these words can be found: "The schools are less and less numerously attended. There is nothing astonishing in the fact. In 1882 there were 127,000 pupils, in 1892 124,000." The Prince further emphasized his opinion by citing a secret report of his predecessor, General Hourko:[1] "At school the Polish child is treated in a hostile spirit. It is there a reproach to be a Pole and an offence to cherish patriotic feelings. His religion even is despised. His mother-tongue is looked upon as the least desirable of languages. When he gets home at night he tells his parents how he is treated and how the Russian child enjoys a preferential position. . . . This mode of administration can have only one consequence. The Polish child learns from his earliest youth to hate all the Russian habits of mind which have inflicted so much injury on himself and caused him such agony and bitter tears."

How the Poles met Persecution

What could Polish public opinion do in the face of this educational policy? Between 1856 and 1862, when the persecution grew somewhat weaker, the Polish leaders, from funds privately provided, founded 600 schools. Libraries, creches, benefit clubs, and continuation classes, were all organized and opened. After 1863 all this had to be done without the cognizance of the authorities. Yet an itinerant university was brought into being and the most eminent Polish professors lectured on art and

[1] In some strange fashion this report has been procured and published in London.

the sciences. That was the door by which the younger generation of the Poles entered the halls of learning. When the Russo-Japanese War supervened, followed as it was by a significant revolution (1904–1906), something more like the air of freedom again suffused the land. The itinerant university became a free seat of learning. The materials were already there—professors and pupils. In spite of a law forbidding private teaching under pain of imprisonment and a fine of £50, elementary teaching continued to be given to the people. Five thousand Warsaw children, according to some statistics of 1903, were in this fashion taught to read and to write. For a long time there have been no more illiterates in our country of Poland.

At the first opportunity given in 1906, the National Education Society was founded, and, though barely tolerated by the Government, it yet covered the whole country during the first twelve months of its existence. 141 schools, 317 creches, 505 libraries and lecture halls were connected with it. There were 63,000 children in these schools, 14,000 little ones in the creches and 400,000 people took advantage of the libraries. After having been in existence for a year and a half all the work was brought to an end. The officials of the Warsaw-Vienna Railway organized in 1907 their own mutual society for education, with an annual expenditure of £6,000. 2,752 children attended 107 elementary schools in connection with this beneficent work. There were 107 teachers, male and female, while 111 students went on to a continuation course of secondary instruction.

In this way the Poles secured their active participation in the achievements of Western civilization. In every way and by every kind of device they founded institutions of public utility for the study of social questions. No one will ever know what time and labour, how much money and how many clever devices, were needed to make these societies possible in face of the authorities.

Already in 1803 Warsaw could boast of a Society of the Friends of Science, the precursor of a regular Academy of Science. From 1821 it possessed a School of Medicine.

The Academy was closed in 1832, and was only reopened in 1906. In the latter year it seemed to awake from a long sleep—a sleep that had lasted three-quarters of a century. Already in 1841 a cry was raised for Land Banks in the towns, but it needed thirty long years of agitation to make them an accomplished fact. It was the Crimean War which enlightened administrative despots and confounded to some extent the schemes of the Russian bureaucrats. Then the Poles began to breathe a little more freely. New institutions came into being. Amongst these were the Agricultural Society (1857) and the Society for the Study of the Fine Arts. Land Banks were allowed in 1870 for Warsaw, in 1873 for Lodz, in 1885 for Kalisz and in 1898 for Radom. In 1870 the Musical Society was formed, in 1875 a Museum of Arts and Crafts, in 1883 a Society for the Relief of Men of Science and Letters. During the governorship of Hourko it was not possible to open a People's Bank, the reason being, according to the Governor of Plotzk, that such a bank would act as a centre or organization for movements of insurrection.

In the country the families of the lords of the manors look upon it as their duty to teach their labourers just as if they were young pupils. A magazine *Polak* (*The Pole*) was published at Cracow and conveyed secretly all over the kingdom. The magazine exercised a splendid influence, and was the cause which chiefly led to the awakening of national sentiment among the peasants. The rural officials were troubled. Soon the Government, too, began to publish a magazine in Polish which they called *Instruction*. The mayors got the order to become subscribers. Every week they distributed copies of the review to the officials of every village. To make it certain that the recipient did not put it into the waste-paper basket, it was necessary to show the last number before one could receive its successor. Nevertheless it was brought back without having been read or even cut. The authorities made trouble, but they recoiled before the unanswerable logic of facts. "The peasants will destroy the magazine if they are compelled to read it,

and they will not hesitate to go to gaol for having thus destroyed it. It will be as well in such circumstances to give up the idea of giving them the paper." Very soon after this sage advice was given the magazine *Instruction* disappeared.

The men who circulated such papers as *Polak* tried also to organize the peasants. They were sent to Siberia for their pains. How many heroes could be found in those secret societies, men of superior mind who learned patience through suffering! It was the same in the working-class movement.

Poland to-day is a country completely in the main current of progress. It has its industry and its proletariat. It has seen socialism and the labour movement flourish in its midst. Prince Imeretynski said, in the report which has already been cited, that the Polish workman has no resemblance to his Russian compeer. His affinities are all with the workmen of the West.

This report dates from 1898 and the Socialist movement in Poland dates from 1877. In 1881 fifty-two socialists were sentenced to deportation. In 1887 the number had risen to 120. In 1888 there was a strike at Zyrardow, involving 6,000 workmen, and the soldiers fired on the crowd. In 1886 four socialists were sentenced to death. The work, however, still went on. Polish socialist publications appeared at Geneva and Paris. In 1892 the Polish Socialist Party (the P.P.S.) was founded at Paris. It put in the forefront of its programme the question of the independence of Poland, and it insisted on the fact that this was a question of international importance. Two years later, however, there was founded the Social Democratic Party, which substituted for the cry of an independent Poland the agitation for a constitution common to the whole Russian Empire. The Polish workmen saw what was the upshot of this in 1905–6. As has been shown above, this workman of the towns is the last result of social evolution, and he, like all the other classes which have disappeared before him, bishop and monk, noble and peasant, has used up the best of his energies in the service of his country.

The year 1905 was in Russia a year of strenuous political life. It was then that the Empire became, according to the Almanack of Gotha, a "constitutional" monarchy under an autocratic Czar. As a "constitutional" monarchy it was presented, in an access of enthusiasm, with a legislative assembly called the Duma. This Duma was the merest embryo of a Parliament. No doubt it was hoped that the embryo might develop normally until at length it might evolve into a Parliament of the Western type. All such hopes were doomed to disappointment. The revolutionary movement was suppressed. A *coup d'état* suppressed the last vestiges of liberty. A fancy franchise was the only result of this immature movement which promised so well.

Let the reader imagine what is involved in this fancy franchise! The members of the Duma are elected in several stages by different electoral colleges. To take part in the voting of a college a man must belong to a certain class or possess a certain property qualification. The members elected for a given district must themselves live in their own district. Even the people chosen to elect them must also reside in the district. This is directly opposed to the usual practice in Western politics, and prevents the would-be member of parliament from presenting himself in the constituency in which he has the most favourable chances of election.

The electors who enjoy a property qualification can authorize others to act and vote on their behalf. This rather unusual privilege was bestowed on them to lessen the number of abstentions amongst such an influential class. The property vote must never be thrown away. The landed proprietor helps to defend the vested interests, and he must not be allowed to efface himself. But that is not all. Women and soldiers on service have also the right to delegate their property qualification, even though they themselves might not have the privilege of voting. The same law refuses them a privilege and then allows them to bestow the forbidden privilege on their party. The system of election introduced in 1906 did not give to the Government the Duma they desired, so

they began by altering the composition of the electorate by strained interpretations of the law. Afterwards came the dramatic development of 3rd June 1907. The Government found a pretext for its action in a conspiracy just discovered, a conspiracy in which the Socialist Left were said to have been involved. M. Stolypin asked that fifty-five deputies should be expelled. The Moderates of the Centre, though they had no sympathy with those who were threatened, deemed such a course foreign to the dignity of a legislative assembly—not to mention that it was a violation of all parliamentary usage. The Duma accordingly appointed a commission to examine the validity of the accusations brought against its fifty-five members. M. Stolypin waited neither for the discussion nor for the report of the commission. The next day the members of the Duma, returning to take up their duties, found the doors closed, and the way to the Chamber guarded by hordes of Cossacks. In the night the accused deputies had been arrested by the police.

The Kingdom of Poland had 36 representatives in the first and second Duma, without counting the Poles (15) elected by the Province of Lithuania and the five elected by Little Russia. The law of 1907 reduced these to 14 representatives of the Kingdom. Two were to be chosen exclusively by the Russian inhabitants. Poland, by a single stroke of the pen, was deprived of two-thirds of its representatives. In the Russian province of the Empire there is one deputy for every 200,000 or 250,000 souls, but in Poland the proportion works out as one to 800,000 or 900,000.

"The Poles," says M. Leroy-Beaulieu, the author of that most admirable of works, *The Empire of the Tzars*, "were all the less prepared for such treatment because in the two first Dumas their representatives had shown themselves the most sagacious—one may even go the length of saying the most Conservative—of all the deputies assembled at the Taurida Palace. So much was this the case, that, in a notorious article in the *Courier Européen*, Björnson even accuses them of being secretly in the service of the Russian Government. There are, of course, Radi-

cals, Progressives, Socialists and Revolutionaries in Poland, as in all other countries, but in this case they had boycotted the electors and the elected persons were loyalist and Catholic Poles, enemies of revolution and of all revolutionary designs.

"These men were content to secure the recognition of their national rights by legal methods and sagacious persuasion of the Government and their fellow-deputies in the assembly of the Empire. Almost alone in the first Duma they were opposed to the new agrarian laws passed in the interests of the moujiks, while in the second Duma they acted with the parties of the Centre. Thanks to their entente with the Moderates, the budget was taken seriously and its passage became absolutely certain. Most excellent of all, they made the announcement, when conceding to the Government all the soldiers they asked for, that they did this because they believed in a strong Empire, which could defend and protect by its power all its peoples. In this second Duma, these Poles (23rd April 1907) laid on the table a proposal for the autonomy of their country. This was not even considered. Since 3rd June 1907 the position of the Polish representatives in the Duma has remained a most difficult one. Deprived of some of their representatives, numerically negligible, they spend their energies in a conflict with that reactionary majority which repays their antagonism with an irreconcilable hatred."

"The action of a Russian Government"—let us now consider the words of a moderate Frenchman, the correspondent of the *Figaro*, M. Rene Marchand—"remains perfectly incomprehensible, and we can only explain it by supposing that those in authority are resolved, through a feeling of mere perversity, to give satisfaction to the narrowest demands of a superficial nationalism."

In April 1905 an imperial rescript bestowed religious liberty on the Empire of Russia. To use again the words of M. Leroy-Beaulieu, "This was the sole reform which could come by administrative order. Had it been generously and sincerely offered, it would have been almost sufficient to recreate a new out of the old Russia. The

first to benefit by it were the Roman Catholics, especially the Uniates, or Catholics with a Greek ritual. Of all the subjects of the Czar, they had suffered most from this regime of religious Russification. Their cult had been removed from the list of those suffered in the Empire. A diocese had been suppressed by rescript under Alexander II, their churches had been handed over to the Orthodox clergy, and they and their families lived under the constant suspicion and surveillance of the Church, the State and the administration. The police took care that they should receive neither sacrament nor succour from the Catholic priests. If they offered any resistance, they were punished in the nineteenth century by the same methods as Catholic France once used to suppress the Huguenots. Fines, flogging, imprisonment, separation of families, confiscations, deportations—the whole paraphernalia of the past was in evidence under the eye of the Grand Inquisitor, Pobedonostseff.

"Rather than receive the sacraments from hands of priests whom they deemed schismatics, a great number of the peasants ceased to avail themselves of the consolations of the Church. They preferred concubinage to a marriage hallowed by such heretical sanctities. Others hastily crossed the forests of the frontier in the dead of night to get secretly married by a Galician priest. But this did not prevent their children from being stigmatized as illegitimate in the Russian law. If the police only discovered a former Uniate on his knees in a Catholic church, or even in conversation with a priest of the same faith, they at once got orders that the church should be closed and the priest deported." Scenes like this have been portrayed in an admirable book, *The Apostle of the Knout in Poland*, by the famous Polish novelist M. Ladislas Reymont. "This is a poignant book," observes a well-known French litterateur, M. Gabriel Sarazin, "and it goes straight to the heart. You cannot read it without being moved through and through. It is a book of horror and sublimity which makes us redden and pale by turns. After reading it we weep because humanity has given birth and being to some of the

monsters who fill its pages. Yet all the same it revives and exalts us. It reveals to us the truth that in our own days, in the midst of that humanity which has become partly degenerate, examples are to be found of moral beauty and fortitude of spirit which have not even been surpassed during the heroic and consecrated epochs of history." Let us borrow from this book of M. Reymont one of its tragic pages :—

In the village of Hrudy in 1876 an order was given to take by force from the village church the children who had not been baptized. To deliver their loved ones from sacrilege, the mothers carried them into a neighbouring forest and remained there three whole weeks. The soldiers grew tired of waiting their return and eventually left the village. Then the lost ones returned from the forest, bent almost to the ground, leaning on sticks, well-nigh naked, fleshless like living skeletons; yet nevertheless radiant like the sun and the springtime, and victorious with the power of life itself.

A young peasant from the village of Klodno was imprisoned, beaten, and tortured because he refused to have baptized at the Orthodox church a boy who had been recently born to him. He was obstinate in his resistance. "I am a Pole and a Catholic," were the only words that escaped his lips. They inflicted fines on him, and he could not pay. They took all that he possessed, even the cow that supplied the sole nutriment of his household. He was literally stripped of the very clothes he wore—that poor miserable—and he had only a few rags to cover his legs. He passed the night in the porch of the church, his arms crossed, weeping bitterly; but he would not falter nor yield. A few days before Christmas the neighbours told him his child was being removed to be confirmed at the Russian church. On hearing this his spirits appeared to revive. He darted through the village, and he visited the sick to bind up their wounds and comfort them with the consolations of their faith. When he met some special friend, he asked pardon for any evil he had ever done him.

But behold, a glancing glare in the skies! The grange of our peasant is in flames, and the sound of a hymn comes from the very centre of the blazing building! It comes from the martyr who is on his knees in prayer in the very midst of the fire which he himself has kindled—that fire which is swallowing him and his. Around the building the villagers are reciting the prayer for the dying, and then, all at once, the grange

vanishes from sight. Only from the very heart of the furnace there is carried a last and terrible cry!

Then the persecution which began with the Uniates ultimately was extended to the Roman Catholics as well. "One can understand," continues M. Leroy-Beaulieu, "how the Uniates felt when the news came to their village that henceforth they might freely conform to the ordinances of their faith. A certain number at once left the official church to go to that of the Roman Catholics, because the rescript of the Czar did not go the length of restoring to them the use of their old fanes. Yet they could not submit themselves to the Roman Catholic supremacy without ceasing to use their old Greek liturgy. In these circumstances Euologius, the Orthodox Bishop of Lublin and a member of the Duma, suggested that a new province should be made of the eastern part of the two governments of Lublin and Siedlce. M. Stolypin approved of the idea. It was a new partition of Poland, and the law finally effecting it was passed on 6th July 1912, after a four-year period of agitation. This new government of Chelm still retained the Code Napoleon, the civil law of Russian Poland, but it was part of the legal circuit of Kieff, where a Russian Court of Appeal had to interpret the Franco-Polish civil code."

Poland a Moral Personality

It is now perfectly plain from this extended research that all the partitions of Poland have made no difference in her moral personality. Never was the conscience of the nation so keen as in the hundred and fifty years after she had been partitioned by her foes. "The soul of Poland," said the eminent professor of Nancy, M. Bertrand Auerbach, "has mastered that mutilated body, which again it revives and vivifies." Another well-known French writer once put it to me in this way: "It is a veritable wonder," said he, "that you, the Poles, living under three Governments, whose mutual frontiers are jealously guarded, with three

different systems of politics and legislation, yet continue to speak the same undivided Polish tongue."

"Would you like to know why?" I asked in reply. And then I told him two simple stories.

One was of a Polish landowner of Posen who happened to be visiting one of his peasants who was ill. When he entered the cottage three portraits hung on the walls, those of Kosciuszko, Leo XIII, and Bismarck.

"Hullo!" he exclaimed, "Bismarck here! Do you put him on the same level with the Holy Father and our national hero?"

"Yes, indeed," replied the peasant, "that is the man who first revealed to me that Poland is my native land." [1]

The other story was a memory from my own experience. In 1910, at a banquet of lawyers, one of them, well known at Wilno for his great ability, was complimented by the others on the incomparable purity of his Polish speech.

"You admire my language?" he asked of his learned friends. "I will tell you how it came to me. Every morning, as I opened my window, I beheld the monument of Mouravyeff, the hangman! It was that sight which educated me to believe that the Polish nation is one and indivisible."

I have now tried to recall some poignant pictures of the life of the three Polands. Any one who has followed me with attention can easily guess the conclusion at which I have arrived. The Polish spirit remains one and indivisible though it runs through the material framework of three separate and several States.

Everywhere the Poles fight for the same old cause. Only their methods are different. In Prussian Poland it was the fight for the land which revealed among the people of Posen a spirit of unflinching self-sacrifice, joined to illimitable patience, of which every Pole is justly and entirely proud. In Galicia the Poles have enjoyed more of the freedom of political life. At the commencement of the nineteenth century they were strangled in the tentacles of the Austrian octopus. It was only after mighty efforts that they extricated

[1] M. Dziembowski-Pomian, member of the German Parliament 1908.

themselves and began a new and reinvigorated existence. They were exploited, in the economic sense, by the richer Habsburg country, and they had to fight long and incessantly in order to preserve their recovered sense of vitality. It was this continuous conflict that created the conditions in Galicia which are favourable to the development of intellectual life, and it was in this way that Polish science received an ever assured shelter.

Galicia, too, was able successfully to develop under conditions which protected her from the vagaries of the public censor. She could express the political thought of Poland as the thoughts of Alsace have never, except in France, been expressed during the last forty-four years. In Russian Poland the national energy had no rest from the machinations of the oppressor. But notwithstanding every kind of hindrance, it has succeeded in expressing itself in a large number of public institutions.

In foreign lands people often say nowadays, "Poland is divided; her people do not know what they want." They impute to our nation all possible kinds of defects. A well-known French historian once said, "Poland is not interesting. It is all very romantic when it is persecuted, but as soon as its affairs begin to mend it simply becomes commonplace. It is moving in the same direction as Russia. It oppresses the feeble Ruthenians and Lithuanians." Another authority considers that Poland is reactionary, and that her methods lack humanity. What have I to say to all the reproaches?

Is it not well to be candid? Is it not true that such defects are found everywhere and at all times? Every modern society, be it French or British, is brought face to face with these perplexing problems, the class war, the conflict of nationalities. I should like it well if my own people were the best of all, if our upper classes were kinder and more sympathetic than can elsewhere be found, if our statesmen were more clear-sighted than all others, but comparative history soon comes in to deposit my dreams amid sober realities.

Finally, I should like to leave, as a souvenir, a jewel of Polish literature, a little parable taken from a won-

derful book, dear to past generations as to our own, the *Book of the Pilgrims* of Adam Mickiewicz:

> A woman had become unconscious and her son called in the doctors.
>
> They all said, "Choose one of us to take charge of the case."
>
> The first said, "I would treat this case according to the method of Brown." But the others replied, "That is a bad method. The woman might as well remain unconscious for ever as have the precepts of Brown applied to her."
>
> A second then said, "I will treat her according to the methods of Haneman." But the others said, "That is a bad method. She might as well die as be treated according to the methods of Haneman."
>
> Then the woman's son broke in and said, "Treat her exactly as you please. But see that at the end you restore her again to the full use of her faculties."
>
> But it was not to be. None of the doctors would yield first place to the other.
>
> In grief and desperation, at last the son cried out, "O my mother! My mother!" And at the sound of her son's voice the woman opened her eyes and consciousness returned to her.

It is by repeating and applying the watchwords of liberty and progress, of democracy and social justice, that the sons of Poland hope to wake up to a new life their oppressed and persecuted Motherland.

HENRYK SIENKIEWICZ

By Monica M. Gardner

No foreign novelist has probably ever been read so widely in this country, and by every class of reader, as the great Polish writer of historical romance, Henryk Sienkiewicz. And yet so far as the general English public is concerned, the Pole, Sienkiewicz, is known by one book only—*Quo Vadis*—which in theme and psychology is not Polish. Magnificent picture as *Quo Vadis* is of Nero's Rome, splendid alike for its gorgeous colouring and its extraordinary moral power, it were alone enough to immortalize its author's name: but Sienkiewicz's title to fame is a far higher one than that of the creator of *Quo Vadis*. Perhaps to few has it been given to be enshrined in the hearts of a whole nation as her adored defender; to have received the homage of all the world of art and letters as a brilliant genius; to go down to the grave mourned with a personal anguish as an irreparable loss by every single one of his compatriots. But such was the lot of Henryk Sienkiewicz.

He was not only the greatest novelist that even the rich literature of Poland has as yet brought forth, but the patriot to whom the eyes of all his nation were turned in her bitter afflictions as her spokesman, her champion, in a sense her moral leader. Amidst the clouds of disaster and sorrow hanging over their beloved country, throngs of Poles on the 22nd of November gathered about the bier of Sienkiewicz in the Vevey church to pay him their last homage. Even after the closing words of the religious rites had been pronounced over his coffin, where it lay watched by a Polish guard of honour and surrounded by national banners, the mourners returned again and again all through the day merely to kneel by what had once been Henryk Sienkiewicz. "We felt," wrote one who had been present to the writer of this article, "as if it were better for us to

be there with him—as if we could not leave the man who was so much to us."

These words need no explanation. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the great writers of Poland have been confronted with a double task. Her poets have been her teachers when she could have no other; her novelists the upholders of the nation's ideals, when by reason of the tragic national conditions she could only learn them in secrecy and at the cost of untold difficulty. We see in Henryk Sienkiewicz one of the greatest geniuses of literature: a novelist who has made dead history live as actuality: a master of description whose war scenes have hardly been surpassed in any language: the writer of manners, the intimate depicter of Polish peasant life. All these things were so many gifts that he gave to Poland. He used them for her sake, in her cause. He began his work as a writer at one of the most dreary and disheartening epochs in the history of his nation. Her hopeless struggle for freedom had been crushed: she was groaning beneath its consequences. The great voices that had spoken to her under similar circumstances in an earlier generation were long since silent in the grave. Then a novelist came forward, pointing to the glorious past as a stepping-stone to an equally glorious future. "Here ends this series of books," are the last words of his great trilogy of historical romance—*With Fire and Sword*, *The Deluge*, *Pan Wolodyjowski*: "written in the course of several years and with no little toil—for the strengthening of hearts." This is the clue to the life-work of Henryk Sienkiewicz.

For this trilogy Sienkiewicz chose that period of the national annals when the Polish Republic was still great, but when the elements of her destruction were beginning to close in upon her: the seventeenth century during which Cossack wars, Turkish, Tartar, Swedish, Russian, and Prussian invasion swept the land. The war novel, properly so called, is wont to be frankly brutal. Sienkiewicz's falls under a wholly different category. Behind the great charges of the Polish cavalry, with their white plumes streaming in the winds of

battle, behind the shock of arms, the cries of Cossack and Tartar, the glare of fire reddening the steppe, there is one high psychological purpose. The Polish knights, perpetually in the saddle, chivalrous and boisterous, with their joy in the stern game of war, their moments of lawlessness, their virtues and their vices, are the ancestors of those for whom Sienkiewicz wrote. The type of patriotism shines out in the figure of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, the hero of Ukrainian warfare, around whom the youth of Poland flocked to learn chivalry and war. When the roll of the drum in vain calls to battle the dead hero, Michal, who may never more hear its summons, it is Sobieski who steps forward to the bier in defence, not only of the Polish Republic, but of all Christendom. The monk, Kordecki, on the walls of Czenstochowa almost single-handed saves Poland in the face of an overwhelming deluge.

But it is not merely to add picturesque settings to romance that the favourite champions and heroic episodes of Polish history live again in Sienkiewicz's pages. It is to bid the sons of the same nation draw strength from the past, hope for the future, endurance in an intolerable present. For Sienkiewicz would have his audience bear in mind that the virtues of the Poles he has painted were the Polish virtues; their failings those which could not defend the Polish Republic from her fate. He therefore lays on the darker shades of Polish history with no unsparing hand. He shows that want of cohesion over which modern Poland may justly boast that she has now gained the mastery. He shows men and women with human characters and human defects. One element saves them through all: the call of their country.

The Knights of the Cross, the later novel treating of the conflict of the Poles with the Teutonic knights, the forerunners of modern Prussia, is symbolical of the eternal strife of the Polish nation with Prussianism and all for which it stands: the war, in other words, of Polish ideals and Polish nationalism against the disciples of Frederick II, Bismarck, and Bernhardi.

Great as Sienkiewicz is in the large field of sustained historical fiction, he is as great and as purely Polish in

that which is so often the stumbling-block to the most finished genius: the short story. Whether he draws his Polish peasant among the fields and plains of Poland or in exile and starvation in foreign lands, it is always with the penetrating gaze of the inspired patriot and artist into the soul of the Pole, be it that of the Polish knight, a Polish peasant forced to serve in the army of the hated Prussian, a little Polish schoolboy overworked and ill-treated by the German master, or a Polish girl starving in the streets of the New World.

Out of so simple an episode as that of a poor old light-house keeper off Panama reading a poem by Mickiewicz, Sienkiewicz built the story of surpassing tenderness of comprehension and poetry of style that we know as *The Lighthouse Keeper*. A Polish exile who has grown gray in his wanderings at last finds a refuge as the keeper of a lighthouse. He is alone with sky, winds and sea, his tired heart lulled to rest by the waves washing the rocks of the lighthouse or beating in fury against its walls. That sound of the sea murmurs all through this story in the word echoes peculiar to the Polish language, but not to be repeated in ours.

By some chance Mickiewicz's *Thaddeus* reaches the lonely Pole, who has not seen his country for forty years, who has neither held a Polish book in his hand or heard Polish spoken for nearly as long. He opens the poem that is the greatest piece of descriptive writing in the Polish tongue, and which transports the Polish reader with a sense of bodily presence home to a lost country. The lighthouse keeper remembers nothing as he reads except a beloved land he will never see again. His cry is that of the poet's opening lines: "Holy Virgin who dost guard bright Czenstochowa, thou wilt restore us by a miracle to the bosom of our land. Bear thou my yearning soul to those wooded hills, those meads of green." And—he forgets to light the lamp and is expelled from the lighthouse. Our last sight of him is when, bent and broken, he is on the steamer, driven from his cherished harbour out into the world of which he had grown so weary.

"New roads of wandering had opened out before him.

The wind again tore forth the leaf, driving it over lands and seas. But in these new roads of life he still had in his bosom his book which, from time to time, he clasped with his hand, as if fearing that it too would be taken from him."

Such stories as *Bartek the Conqueror* and *The Diary of a Posen Tutor* might be pages from the daily lives of any Pole living under the iron rule of Prussia. The theme of the former is but too apposite to the present hour. The Polish peasant, conscripted as a soldier to fight for his Prussian oppressors in the Franco-Prussian War, finds himself on guard over a couple of prisoners who are to be shot on the morrow. He hears them talking to one another in his own language, and, in an agony of grief, comprehends for the first time that he, a Pole, has been constrained to fight against Poles. Slow to take in an idea, equally slow to part with it, he hesitates whether he will not release the two whom he overhears praying in his own familiar tongue, and fly with them. This is told in a scene of singular and touching beauty. The guard is changed and it is too late. He goes home when the war is over to see his son the victim of the Prussian rod, himself lodged in a Prussian jail for defending his own child against Prussian brutality. The bitter irony of the situation speaks straight to every Polish heart.

The Diary of a Posen Tutor is another and a sadly familiar phase in the Prussian persecution of Poland. It is the story of the Polish child in the schools of Prussian Poland, whose brain is driven to death by the strain of learning hard lessons through the only medium that he is allowed to use—the imperfectly understood German language imposed upon him instead of his own—and who must listen in painful silence to the coarse gibes heaped by the Prussian master on everything that is Polish. All these things are not fiction. They are facts related by a pen of genius, whose art is never sacrificed to truth nor its truth to art.

For albeit Sienkiewicz is a great patriotic teacher, he is never didactic or obvious. Even in his stories and novels of modern life, where his intention is to warn his fellow-Poles against want of dogma, frivolity of outlook,

unsteadiness of moral perception, his is no pulpit utterance. He never ceases to be the splendid artist, whose inner purpose is there for those who seek it, without confronting the mere careless reader in the face.

Behind his brilliant colour and wealth of description there runs that strain of wild and melancholy poetry, native to so many Polish writers, inspired as it were by the sigh of the forests and the wind over the steppes and plains of Poland: the strange Slavonic sense of the unearthly. We see this strongly marked in peasant sketches like *Janko*, where the frail village child, born with the soul of a musician that no one understands, draws music from every rustle of the trees: or again in the story of the little girl in the snow-covered forest of the Polish winter, hearing an angel's steps in the faint sound of unknown feet that are in reality bringing her a horrible death. We meet it again and again in his historical romances. It is in his prelude to the great drama of war that *With Fire and Sword* opens. "Night fell upon the desert, and with it came the hour of ghosts. The knights on guard in the outposts told each other that by night in the wild fields the shades of the slain rise who fell there in sin and sudden death. They said, too, that those shades of soldiers, lurking in the desert, bar the way to travellers, wailing and entreating for a sign of the cross. A practised ear can distinguish from far off the crying of the ghosts from that of wolves. There were also seen whole armies of ghosts which at times came so near the outposts that the sentinels gave the alarm. This usually foretold a great war."

With eloquence like to that with which he had told the glory and the sufferings of his country, Sienkiewicz in later years addressed open letters to governments, sovereigns, notable personages, to the civilized world, pleading for his nation. Among these may be especially cited that of 1907 against the Prussian law of expropriation, and the impassioned appeal in the early months of the war to all Christendom to take pity upon the starving children of Poland. It will be remembered that the law of expropriation was nothing less than the arbitrary eviction of

Polish landholders from their estates which the Prussian Government decreed were to pass into German hands. Sienkiewicz sent an open letter to every illustrious man of letters, calling upon him to protest publicly against this iniquitous enactment. "The Poles," he wrote, "will be at last driven forth from that soil which is their native land, the beloved earth where, for centuries, long generations have been born, have lived, and are buried." Exiled by the war to the foreign country where he was to die, Sienkiewicz, on the 5th of February, 1915, with that patriotic passion that had guided the hand of the creator of the greatest historical romance ever written, set forth the appalling horrors that the present cataclysm has brought upon his country, and summoned the Christian world to save thousands of his countrymen from death by hunger and want.

"Children are stretching out their emaciated arms, asking bread of their mothers; but Polish mothers have nothing to give them, nothing but tears. Has Poland, my country, then no right to your succour? Dismembered and conquered, she has never ceased to struggle against brute force, or to proclaim aloud the rights sacred to all free peoples. It is in the name of the fellowship of humanity, in the name of a nation which has remained faithful to this principle, in the name of Christ, that I address this appeal to civilized nations. May Polish mothers be able to answer their starving children with something more than tears! May the Polish people be able to live out the hour of their supreme test and await, with hope in their hearts, the approaching dawn of resurrection!"

This dawn Sienkiewicz was not to behold. In the midst of his untiring activities for his country, at the very moment when she stands most in need of his counsel and his help, when he was preparing once more to appeal in behalf of the rights of Poland to the Europe in whose hands lies the future of the nations, he has been struck down by sudden death. "I shall never see the freedom of Poland," were the dying words of him who had loved and served his nation so well.

"THE YOUNG GIRL"

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF ANDRÉ SAURÈS (*Occident*, PARIS 1915), BY D. C. F. HARDING

O LOVE! A year of war! The months have swung full circle, and we, the betrothed, sorrowful yet smiling, eager for joy now vanished, call to you.

Where are you our beloved ones? Our voice rings out passionately, entreats you from the depths.

Beloved ones, where are you, so gentle, so dear to those who await you? No longer may we dance but we can still sing our sorrow. . . .

Last night, one came who knocked on our door; she summoned us and she, too, a virgin, wept and said, "I am Poleska, the young daughter of Poland. Sisters of England! sisters of France! do you know to what melody your Polish sisters dance and sing this season? Their offering is a crown of mistletoe and a lute of tears. Death is the piper whose tune they follow. They wander forth, wreathed with poppies for mourning and cornflowers for farewell, and, with spades in their hands from dawn to eve, they dig deep ditches. In the quiet earth they lay their promised ones, their lovers. . . . This is the Summer festival of Poland—the grave their marriage bed."

Then, her message delivered, this dark blue-eyed daughter of the East grew pale, and like a broken lily bowed her slender neck and softly weeping passed away. And you! oh gentle mourners of lost kisses, sheltered by the hedge throughout this long Winter, think of those on the shadowy plain! What was your Spring and what your Summer?

Lift up towards us your beautiful dimmed eyes; answer us, pray for us, children of the sun, dear sisters of the Western world! . . .

VIEWS AND REVIEWS

THE close of the year 1916 has brought all the political parties in Poland, Progressive and Conservative, into line with the policy of an independent Polish State. This remarkable result has been achieved by the German proclamation which, as between autonomy and independence, pronounced formally in favour of the latter and thus forced all patriotic Poles to declare their side. The significance of this almost complete unanimity among the representatives of a nation cannot be doubted. Formerly, in this country and in France, many publicists hinted at the fact that there was no concensus of opinion among the Poles themselves, and spoke of the desire for independence as the misguided dream of a few infatuated enthusiasts. No longer, in face of recent developments, can such a view be defended. So strong, in fact, is now the opinion in the kingdom in favour of independence, that members of the National Democratic and Conservative parties residing abroad—men who formerly were supposed to be in favour of the Russian solution—have been obliged, in order to keep themselves in touch with the remnant of their parties in Warsaw, to range themselves amongst those who lay stress on independence. Numerous meetings have been organized all over the kingdom of Poland, and the resulting demands of the people may be summarized as follows: (1) That the executive power should be placed in the hands of a Polish Council of State; (2) that a Parliament should be elected on a democratic franchise with real legislative powers; (3) that a Regent should be immediately appointed. Their demands include considerably more than has, as yet, been offered to Poland from the side of the Allies, and therein lies the fateful seriousness of the present situation.

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The first question which presented itself in this altered situation was the creation of a Council of State which would act for the time being as an advisory body and also elaborate a Constitution and prepare for the election of a Parliament. Joseph Pilsudski was

entrusted by the Governor-General with the preparation of a scheme and, after some negotiations, an agreement was arrived at by which the National Democratic and Conservative parties were to have ten representatives, and the Independent parties fifteen, on the new body. Prince Lubomirski, already known for his splendid work on the Warsaw Municipal Council, was to be the chairman. General Von Beseler, however, would not agree to this. He desired to limit the National Democratic and Conservative members to seven. The latter would not assent, and the Council was finally arranged with fifteen members of the Independent parties, seven of no party, and three clergymen nominated by the Archbishop of Warsaw. M. Dierzbicki was appointed chairman, with the title of "Marshal of the Crown."

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This Council took up its duties on the 9th of January. Besides the twenty-five members already mentioned, the Governor-Generals of both zones of occupation each appoint their one or more representatives; and when complete, the Council proceeds to appoint an Executive. The duties of the body are defined as follows: It must express its opinion on any new legislative measure which may be submitted to it by the Governor-General; and it must collaborate in the drafting of a new Constitution for the kingdom. In order to accomplish this, it must (*a*) prepare projects of law to regulate the election of National representaties on both zones of occupation; (*b*) prepare for a Polish Administration. Besides, it will be within its competence (1) to present to the Governor-General such projects and offer such advice as it may deem necessary; (2) to collaborate with the High Commands of the Central Empires in the creation of a Polish army; (3) to arrive at binding decisions in the matter of the country's economic revival, and to assign to the work they approve the necessary credits from funds placed at their disposal by the Central Empires; always provided that they may themselves raise funds by taxation or loan. In all these operations under the third head their decisions require to be approved by the administration of the zone of occupation to which they relate—an administration which will afterwards proceed to give them legal effect.

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A new work by Jan Kucharzewski, a well-known Polish historian and politician, is entitled *L'Europe et le Problème Russo Polonais* (Lausanne), and is the thirteenth of a useful series "La Pologne et la Guerre." It deals with the diplomatic intercourse of European Powers on the subject of Poland since the epoch of the partition, with special stress on the Russo-Polish conflict. It

throws much new light on this important subject, is splendidly illustrated, and contains the result of many new historical researches. It should be read with interest by all statesmen and publicists.

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British readers are now coming face to face with the masterpieces of modern Polish literature in the excellent translations of Miss Benecke and Miss Busch. Their *More Tales by Polish Authors* (Blackwell, 5s. net) introduces the important names of Boleslaw Prus and Reymont. Prus, whose Egyptian historical romance has already been translated in America, belongs to the Positivist school in Poland, who, after the insurrection of 1863, induced promising young men to give up their idea of emigration and to devote themselves to the material reconstruction of their country. He had a strangely varied life—mathematician, publicist, and pedagogue, and the study of Polish factory life which is here translated reveals the keenness of his observation, the breadth of his humanity, and his grave and ironical humour. Reymont, who has had a wandering life and has travelled over Germany and the United States, has portrayed peasant life with a realism that recalls the method of Zola; but in all his most realistic figures there is an atmosphere of poetry and a flavour of the springtime which goes very far beyond the art of the French writer. "The Trial," which is here translated, should be read by every student of modern literature who has not previously been acquainted with the art of Poland. Such a reader would, perhaps, be even more struck with "The Stronger Sex" which is a characteristic sample of the art of Zeromski, who, sprung from the nobility, consecrated his art to the proletariat, and wrote *Les Miserables* of Poland. One thing this book will surely show, that modern Polish writers have been far too long neglected in this country. They overflow with humanity; they are frank, cordial, and robust; they are less passive than Tolstoy, and more serene than Dostoievsky; they are bold in metaphor and responsive to all kinds of weird and startling influences and sounds, and they reveal a love of the homeland which persecution has not daunted, and which remains unrepressed and irrepressible throughout all the calamities and bereavements of a great European War.

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Miss Livesay has translated some *Songs of Ukraina* (J. M. Dent & Sons), and the result is a volume which must interest every lover of freedom and every student of folklore. The songs have been gathered from the lips of emigrants who have come to Canada, and they are full of plaintive outpourings from the life of a

sorely tried race. Most of them are translated in unrhythmed lines, and thus they lack the measured beat of the popular ballad in its own tongue; but with all their drawbacks they supply ample evidence of the fact that "the singing of the Ukrainean is also a precious pearl in the common treasury of mankind."

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Of all the many periodicals which have recently appeared dealing with the Polish question, there is none more strikingly original than *Le Moniteur Polonais* (17 Rue de Bourg, Lausanne). Its point of view may be conveyed in the following extract from the first number: "The longer the war lasts, and the farther it extends, the more clearly there is revealed the absolute necessity for the world at large of a great and a free Poland. Poland appears necessary for the Central Empires against Russia, for Russia against the Central Empires, and for Europe against both." Yet many friends of the Entente, while they admit the claims of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Bohemia, and Roumania, will refuse the same measure of satisfaction to Poland.

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Poland's Case for Independence (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 7s. 6d.) is absolutely essential to every British friend of Poland, because it presents a reasoned account of the Polish as opposed to the German reading of Polish history. The latter version, which has impressed itself on many scholars in this country, under the guise of "realism," makes a great parade of its appeal to documents; but, as may be seen from a study of Sybel, the leading representative of the theory, it is based on the assumption that the age of King Kazimierz Jagielonczyk is the ideal age of Polish history. Then you had a king more nearly approaching a German Kaiser, who, so the theory goes, knew how, like Bismarck, to broad-base his power for his own ends on the szlachta or people. Afterwards Poland degenerated from this high estate. She became anarchical, i.e., she adopted democratic expedients and devices which are foreign to the German constitution and do not "square" with the theories of "efficiency" and "Kultur." Therefore Poland fell; or as Carlyle, another advocate of the theory, put it, "the partition of Poland was an event inevitable in Polish history, an operation of Almighty Providence and of the eternal laws of nature." This almost reads like a rescript of the Kaiser Wilhelm II; and the significance of the present book is that it shows that the view of Polish history which the Germans and their disciples call "idealistic," is supported by an overwhelming array of facts and can be sustained by a study of the original documents.

The Italian journal *Eroica*, notwithstanding all the difficulties the war has placed in Italy on the part of typographical adventure, has issued a splendid number devoted entirely to the interests of Poland: Poland in many aspects of her varied and irresistible national life—literary, musical, scientific, and the fine arts! The number consists of 225 pages, and in its illustrations and general get-up is a splendid example of the most approved Italian typography.

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Quite a welcome little volume is *La Question Juive en Pologne* (Paris: Librairie Fischbacher), with an introduction by M. Gabriel Séailles, and opinions on the Jewish problem in Poland by about fourteen representative Poles. Some of these opinions are very detailed, and deal in a very interesting fashion with the question how far Poles and Jews will be able to co-operate together in helping on the resurrection of Poland. All agree that Jews may be trusted to place themselves in line with the Polish national aspirations and hopes. "When I was in Siberia," writes the Polish publicist, M. Balicki, and the illustration is significant, "I watched Jews at some embankment work, and I could see that they had adapted themselves to the occasion and were amongst the most skilful of the workmen." In the same way he believes that they will work at the upbuilding of a Polish State; while the Poles, on their part, will grant them equal rights and parallel opportunities.

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The Soul of Russia, edited by Miss Winifred Stephens (Macmillan & Co., 10s. 6d.), is a book which does infinite credit both to the editor and the publishers. Both in its art illustrations and in its examples of Russian folklore and its elucidations of Russian social life and literature, it is a new revelation of what Turgeniev called "anonymous Russia." Readers of this review will turn with interest to Professor Vinogradoff's treatment of the "Task of Russia" in the future. It is to be confessed at once that they will be somewhat disappointed; for Professor Vinogradoff's lecture is the work of a cloistered student rather than one who looks straight at the present-day situation and judges it in the light of ever-changing events. He rightly sees that "Lithuania, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, the Serbian lands, Rumania, and Bulgaria" are going to be the thorny problems of the war; but he lays too great stress on their irreconcilable ambitions, and hence too hastily concludes in the case of Poland that only local home rule would be possible under the protection of Russia, which would control her army and manage her foreign affairs. And yet the same Professor Vinogradoff tells us that the watchword of the Entente is the "rights of small nationalities."

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